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Inefficiency of Specific Performance as 
a Contractual Remedy in Chinese 
Courts:  An Empirical and Normative 
Analysis 
Lei Chen* & Larry A. DiMatteo** 
Abstract: 
This article investigates the values and latent policies in the area of the 
availability of specific performance (SP) as a contractual remedy, which have 
shaped the development of Chinese law. The National People’s Congress 
(Legislature) and Supreme People’s Court in China have addressed the remedial 
structure of Chinese contract law, namely, the availability of the remedy of SP as 
opposed to the awarding of damages only. The law is clear that the remedies of 
SP and damages are ordinary remedies that a claimant is free to choose between. 
The question that this article confronts is whether in practice the equality of SP 
and damages as remedies are applied in a neutral, unbiased way by the Chinese 
courts. Simply put, how often do Chinese courts use SP as a remedy for contract 
breaches? If SP is seldom awarded, the question then becomes: what are the 
underlying reasons or rationales given for its underutilization? This article 
employs an empirical study based on data collected by surveys and follow-up 
interviews with hundreds of Mainland Chinese judges at various levels of the 
Chinese court system (related to civil and commercial disputes). Based on the 
statistical findings of the empirical study, a theoretical inquiry is offered to better 
understand the relative use or non-use of specific performance as a contractual 
remedy. The findings show that damages are often favored over SP; additionally, 
judges in the Mainland Chinese court system take a far more proactive role in the 
preliminary stages of trials and will actively persuade parties to claim damages 
over specific performance where expedient. The study also shows that, despite 
popular belief, the higher supervision costs associated with specific performance 
are not a determinative factor in the decision not to award SP. 
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The fundamental contractual obligation is to deliver the promised 
performance. A specific performance (SP) remedy is a court order that 
compels a breaching-party to fulfill its contractual promise.1 The alternative 
to the issuance of an SP order is the granting of compensatory damages.2 
Comparative studies have shown that while the common law world favors 
awarding damages over ordering SP, civil law systems endorse SP, at least 
in principle. In the civil law, SP is seen as a primary remedy equivalent to 
the remedy of damages.3 Doctrinally, Chinese law adopts the civil law 
approach in not prioritizing damages over specific performance.4 
Alternatively stated, the common law sees equitable remedies, such as 
SP, injunction, rescission, and reformation, as extraordinary remedies to be 
given when the legal remedy of damages does not provide adequate redress.5 
                                                          
1 Amy H. Kastely, The Right to Require Performance in International Sales: Towards 
an International Interpretation of the Vienna Convention, 63 WASH. L. REV. 607, 632 (1988) 
(“Under Anglo-American law, specific performance refers to a judicial order requiring the 
performance of a party’s contractual obligations.”). 
 2 It should be noted that the non-breaching party might claim damages along with a SP 
order, for incidental damages mostly related to the delay in performance. The damages are not 
technically compensatory in nature since the non-breaching party’s harm is rectified by actual 
performance. 
 3 Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Why No “Efficient Breach” in the Civil Law?: A Comparative 
Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 721, 726-33 
(2007); Henrik Lando & Caspar Rose, On the enforcement of specific performance in Civil 
Law countries, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 473 (2004); PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL 
RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) FULL 
EDITION, 825 (Christian von Bar & Eric Clive eds., 2010) 825; PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN 
CONTRACT LAW: PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000); Lucinda Miller, 
Specific Performance in the Common and Civil Law: Some Lessons for Harmonisation, in RE-
EXAMINING CONTRACT AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT: ANGLO-CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES 288-89 
(Paula Giliker ed., 2007). 
 4 Article 107 of the Chinese Contract Law reads: “If a party fails to perform its 
obligations under a contract, or its performance fails to satisfy the terms of the contract, it shall 
bear the liabilities for breach of contract such as to continue to perform its obligations, to take 
remedial measures, or to compensate for losses.” Contract Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (Adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress on Mar. 15, 
1999 and promulgated by Order No. 15 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on 
Mar. 15, 1999) [hereinafter CCL]. Some scholars argue that specific performance takes 
precedence in the hierarchy of remedies since specific performance was spelled out first in the 
provision. See WANG LI MING, STUDY ON CONTRACT LAW 557 (2011). Others maintain that 
there is no hierarchical difference between damages and specific performance given the fact 
that both appear in the same sentence. See THE LAW OF CONTRACT 316 (Jianyuan Cui ed., 3d 
ed. 2010); SHIYUAN HAN, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 547 (4th ed. 2018). While specific 
performance is not expressly stated to be a primary remedy in China, it is, as a matter of 
principle, generally available as an option for aggrieved parties. 
 5 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 380 
(4th ed. 2010) (“It is hornbook law that equity will not act if there is an adequate remedy at 
law.”); Javierre v. Central Altagracia, 217 U.S. 502, 508 (1910) (“[A] suit for damages would 
have given adequate relief, and therefore the appellee should have been confined to its remedy 
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SP is only given where the subject matter of the contract is considered to be 
unique, such as in the sale of works of art, or more commonly, the sale of 
real estate. In sale-of-goods transactions, the subject matter is considered to 
be fungible; therefore, legal damages are easily calculable by using the price 
differentials between the contract price and the market price, or the contract 
price and the price of substituted goods.6  There is rather deep 
comparative law literature comparing the role of SP in the civil and common 
laws,7 but that literature is conceptual in nature, while this article pursues an 
empirical methodology. Part II briefly examines the debate over SP as an 
ordinary remedy in American legal scholarship, as well as the divergence 
between the civil and common laws on the subject. It discusses the 
proposition that the divergence, despite the counterpoise in black letter law, 
is not as great as it seems on the surface. It also focuses on the different 
viewpoints on the subject in common law scholarship, along with the trend 
towards a more expansive use of SP in the common law. The second section 
discusses the divergence between the formal civil law rules as written versus 
as applied by the courts, to show that SP is more frugally used than is 
commonly understood in legal scholarship. Part III briefly examines the 
evolution of Chinese contract law and its use of SP. Part IV examines the 
design and findings of an empirical study of Chinese judges on their feelings 
and use of SP. Part V offers a descriptive theory of remedies in order to better 
frame the use of SP in practice, while Part VI provides a normative theory of 
SP based upon the norms of efficiency and fairness. 
                                                          
at law”). 
 6 U.C.C. § 2-712(2) provides that, in cases where the buyer purchases substituted goods, 
it “may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the cost of cover and the 
contract price”; U.C.C. § 2-713(1) provides that, in cases of non-delivery or repudiation, “the 
measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference between the 
market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach”. See U.C.C. §§ 2-712, 2-713 
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). Article 75 of the U.N. Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods provides that “the party claiming damages may recover the 
difference between the contract price and the price in the substitute transaction . . .” U.N. 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 75, Mar. 2, 1987, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. CISG Article 76 provides that 
“the party claiming damages may, if he has not made a purchase . . . recover the difference 
between the price fixed by the contract and the current price at the time of avoidance.” Id. at 
art. 76. 
 7 See John P. Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 MICH. L. REV. 
495 (1959) (tracing the development of the specific performance idea in Roman Law, 
classical, post-classical and medieval law); Shael Herman, Specific Performance: a 
Comparative Analysis (1), 7 EDINBURGH L. REV. 6 (2003); Guenter Treitel, Remedies for 
Breach of Contract, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 155 (Arthur 
von Mehren ed., 1976); Gerard De Vries, Right to Specific Performance: Is There a 
Divergence between Civil- and Common-Law Systems and, If So, How Has It Been Bridged 
in the DCFR?, 4 EUR. REV. PVT. L. 581 (2009). 
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II. DAMAGES-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE DEBATE 
Michel Cannarsa has attributed the divergence in civil and common law 
in the remedial area to the larger role that the morality of promise8 plays in 
the civil law system. He states that “[t]his divergence is attributed to the 
‘moral dimension’ of the contractual commitment in civil law jurisdictions. 
The one who does not perform his contractual obligations is seen as 
breaching a moral commitment and is therefore forced, by the courts, to keep 
his commitment.”9 In contrast, the common law sees SP as an inefficient 
remedy when damages are determined to be sufficient to fully compensate 
the non-breaching party.10 Thus, SP is reserved as an extraordinary remedy 
for cases where the subject matter of the contract is deemed to be unique. 
The divergence between the civil and common laws in the area of 
remedies (SP as an ordinary or extraordinary remedy) is, like most of the 
well-recognized divergences between the two legal systems, an 
oversimplification. Lando and Rose showed in an empirical study that 
although the civil and common law treat the availability of SP differently, in 
practice, they have reached similar results or outcomes as to when SP is to 
be granted.11 This convergence theory states that, in practice, there is less 
difference between common and civil law systems than the doctrinal 
statement of law might suggest.12 
                                                          
 8 The morality of promise has seen some revised interest in American scholarship. See 
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 14-16 
(1981); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 708, 722 (2007); Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1603 (2009). 
 9 Michel Cannarsa, Chinese Contract Law on Remedies and Damages: A Civil Law 
Perspective, in CHINESE CONTRACT LAW: CIVIL AND COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVES 410-11 
(Larry A. DiMatteo & Lei Chen eds., 2018). The morality of specific performance is also 
found in American legal scholarship. See FRIED, supra note 8, at 16; Randy E. Barnett, 
Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, in SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY 179-83 (Ellen 
Frankel Paul ed., 1986); Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1, 13-14 (1989); Daniel Friedmann, Economic Aspects of Damages and Specific Performance 
Compared, in CONTRACT DAMAGES: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 65 
(Djakhongir Saidov & Ralph Cunnington eds., 2008); Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of 
Contract Remedies— Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 
138 (1981). 
 10 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1981) (“[S]pecific performance 
. . . will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the 
injured party.”) (Comment a. states that: “Adequacy is to some extent relative, and the modern 
approach is to compare remedies to determine which is more effective in serving the ends of 
justice.”). 
 11 Lando & Rose, supra note 3, at 473 (arguing that despite black letter law recognizing 
SP as an ordinary remedy, it is rarely used in many civil law countries). “[E]mpirical 
observation is that specific performance is not enforced in Denmark for production contracts 
. . . In Germany and France, while enforced (although with many exceptions), claims for 
specific performance are rare.” Id. at 480. 
 12 Id. at 474 (“Alternatively, it may be argued that specific performance is not, in practice, 
the routine contract remedy in Civil Law countries. Some scholars note a trend toward 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 40:275 (2020) 
280 
The common law has in-depth legal literature discussing the proper use 
of specific performance vis-à-vis the awarding of damages. Lord Hoffmann 
proclaimed that: “there is less difference between common law and civilian 
systems than these general statements might lead one to suppose.”13 He 
maintains that “judges [in civil and common law systems] take much the 
same matters into account in deciding whether [SP] would be inappropriate 
in a particular case.”14 Allan Farnsworth sees a trend in American law where 
SP has been used in areas traditionally covered by an award of damages.15 
A. The Common Law Debate 
The common law views the payment of compensatory damages as 
satisfying the breaching party’s contractual obligations. In the immortal 
words in his 1897 seminal article, The Path of the Law, Chief Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr. stated that: 
Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more 
manifest than in the law of contract. Among other things, here again 
the so-called primary rights and duties are invested with a mystic 
significance beyond what can be assigned and explained. The duty to 
keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay 
damages if you do not keep it, and nothing more.16 
More recently, other American scholars have argued that the awarding 
of compensatory damages for breach of contract is a more efficient remedy.17 
                                                          
convergence in contract remedies in Civil and Common Law countries.”). Steven Shavell, 
Specific Performance Versus Damages for Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 831, 869 (2006). 
 13 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd. [1998] AC 1 (HL) 
11 (appeal taken from AC). 
 14 Id. at 11-12. 
 15 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 854 (2d ed. 1990). Farnsworth asserts that: 
“Nevertheless, the modern trend is clearly in favor of the extension of specific relief at the 
expense of the traditional primacy of damages.” Id. 
 16 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). 
 17 E.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 369 (1978) 
(arguing for the efficiency of the common law distinction unique versus fungible goods and, 
therefore, specific performance is only warranted in cases involving unique items: 
“[P]romisors and promisees will typically favor a money damages rule if the subject matter of 
their contract is not unique.”); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Damages Versus 
Specific Performance: Lessons from Commercial Contracts, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 29, 
68 (2015) (“Our data provide modest endorsement of specific performance being subordinate 
to the default damages rule because a majority of contracts accept the default rule . . .”); Jeffrey 
L. Harrison, A Nihilistic View of the Efficient Breach, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 167, 209 (2013) 
(“Arguments that specific performance is more efficient apply a very myopic concept of 
efficiency.”); Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1424 (1982) (“[T]he case for expanding the availability of specific 
performance is seriously flawed.”); Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame A Contract 
Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1349, 1361 (2009) (endorsing the traditional rule but recognizing 
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Others, most recently including law and economic scholars, have argued 
otherwise, viewing SP as the better or more efficient remedy.18 
Alan Schwartz has argued that SP is more efficient than damages 
because it achieves the goal of compensation better and reduces transaction 
costs in the negotiation and performance of contracts.19 However, it seems 
that Chinese jurisprudence is inconclusive as to whether there should be an 
increased use of SP instead of deferring to a damage calculation.20 The 
use of SP is clearly warranted in cases where damages are difficult to prove.21 
An example is where the non-delivery of a component part results in lost 
sales (breach of downstream contracts), which will cause negative 
reputational effects into the future. If Party A elects to breach a contract to 
deliver component parts to Party B in a just-in-time contract (where substitute 
parts are not readily at hand), Party B will under-produce the amount of its 
product needed to fulfill existing downstream contracts. Party B will be able 
to collect lost profits for its failure to perform on existing contracts with its 
customers. However, it is conceptually clear that a loss of future sales will 
also be suffered by Party B. Some of Party B’s existing buyers will go 
elsewhere to fill their needs and Party B may be branded as a non-reliable 
supplier. However, these damages will not be collectable because they are 
speculative in nature; there is no certain way to determine the actual damages. 
Under the common law, SP would be denied because the goods were 
relatively fungible in nature. A court may also argue that Party B should have 
taken precautions to prevent a gap in production. Civil law is more likely to 
see the uniqueness of component parts at the time of breach. A civilian court 
may also recognize the under-compensatory nature of contract damages in 
such a scenario and see that only SP has the ability to make Party B whole. 
This is assuming that the order of SP is available prior to the production 
stoppage. In sum, the argument for the expanded use of SP in the common 
                                                          
that the arguments for and against the rule are “not conclusive . . .”). 
 18 E.g., Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L. J. 271, 305 (1979) 
(“Because specific performance is a superior method for achieving the compensation goal, 
promisees should be able to obtain specific performance on request.”); Thomas S. Ulen, The 
Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. 
L. REV. 341, 343 (1984) (“[S]pecific performance is more likely than any form of money 
damages to achieve efficiency in the exchange and breach of reciprocal promises”); see also 
Shavell, supra note 12, at 875-76 (describing that some evidence exists that specific 
performance is the preferred remedy). Cf. Timothy J. Muris, The Costs of Freely Granting 
Specific Performance, 1982 DUKE L. J. 1053 (1982). 
 19 Schwartz, supra note 19, at 271 .  
 20 Lei Chen, Availability of Specific Remedies in Chinese Contract Law, in STUDIES 
IN THE CONTRACT LAWS OF ASIA I: REMEDIES FOR BREACH IN OF CONTRACT 21 (Mindy 
Chen-Wishart, Alexander Loke & Burton Ong eds., 2016) [hereinafter Availability of 
Specific Remedies].  
 21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360(a) (1981) (A factor in determining 
whether damages are inadequate, thereby justifying an order of SP, is “the difficulty of proving 
damages with reasonable certainty . . .”). 
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law has been rooted in the rationales of efficiency and morality.22 
B. Civil Law’s Application of the Remedy of Specific Performance 
Again, civil law recognizes SP as an ordinary remedy, meaning a non-
breaching party has the right to elect between pure damages or SP even in 
cases of fungible goods.23 The purpose of this article is to determine whether 
SP is more likely to be awarded under a civil law system than a common law 
system by undertaking an analysis of the Chinese court system as a case 
study. China is a civil law country, in which contract law views damages and 
SP as primary and equal remedies.24 
The empirical survey presented here, which includes the collection of 
questionnaires from over three hundred Chinese judges, seeks to ascertain 
whether or not and to what extent the above legal divergence is reflected in 
actual judicial practice in the Chinese court system. Chinese law presents a 
particularly important and understudied area for the study of the use of SP as 
a remedy of first choice. This is due to the changing legal and economic 
context in which contract law and the dynamics of business transactions have 
undergone in the last few decades.25 As a result, a gap exists between contract 
law’s underlying assumptions (law in books) and the modern reality of how 
                                                          
 22 From a normative perspective, there are arguments for specific performance and 
arguments for damages. Shiffrin, supra note 8 at 722; Kronman, supra note 18, at 351; Hayk 
Kupelyants, Specific Performance in the Draft Common Frame of Reference, 1 U. COLL. 
LOND. J. L. & JURIS. 15, 45 (2012). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 
(1981). Comment a states that: “There is, however, a [modern] tendency to liberalize the 
granting of equitable relief [SP] by enlarging the classes of cases in which damages are not 
regarded as an adequate remedy.” This statement recognizes that efficiency rationales must be 
balanced against morality or justice rationales. 
 23 SOLÈNE ROWAN, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
THE PROTECTION OF PERFORMANCE 19 (2012). 
 24 The Chinese civil law tradition finds its historical roots in the late Qing Dynasty (1902–
1911). Lei Chen, The Historical Development of the Civil Law Tradition in China: a Private 
Law Perspective, 78 THE LEGAL HIST. REV. 159, 179 (2010) [hereinafter Historical 
Development]; Lei Chen, Contextualizing Legal Transplant: China and Hong Kong, in 
METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 202-03 (P.G. Monateri ed., 2012). The influence of the 
German Civil Code is also seen when the Qing Civil Code Draft followed the German 
approach when it separated the civil code from a special commercial code. See DOUGLAS R. 
REYNOLDS, CHINA, 1898–1912: THE XINZHENG REVOLUTION AND JAPAN 18-28 (1993). The 
common law’s focus on individualism did not fit well with Chinese communitarianism; also, 
the scattered nature of common law legal sources was consuming to Chinese scholars. See 
Roscoe Pound, The Chinese Civil Code in Action, 29 TUL. L. REV. 277, 289 (1955). 
 25 Take third party rights for example. Initially when the Contract Law of 1999 was 
enacted, the legislature affirmed the principle of contractual privity in the absence of explicit 
recognition of third-party rights. However, given the social and economic condition changes, 
the time is ripe to introduce a legislative reform granting a third party an independent right of 
action. See Lei Chen, Relaxations of Contractual Privity and the Need for Third Party Rights 
in Chinese Contract Law, in STUDIES IN THE CONTRACT LAWS OF ASIA II: FORMATION AND 
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES 62-63 (Mindy Chen-Wishart, Alexander Loke & Burton Ong 
eds., 2018). 
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contract law is applied (law in action).26 This study will show that the 
generalization that Chinese courts treat SP as a routine remedy is not only 
superficial, but belies actual practice. 
The substantial body of literature justifying the use or nonuse of SP, 
discussed above, lacks empirical verification.27 Despite the existence of a rich 
and deep theoretical literature on the relative merits and moral justifications 
of SP and damages as contract remedies,28 there is a surprising dearth of 
empirical research. This presents an opportunity for scholars to explore and 
further understand this academic debate in the context of empirical studies, 
such as the current undertaking on the use of SP in the Chinese court 
system.29 At the same time, empirical studies could help respond to the lack 
of reliable and empirical knowledge about the application of law by the 
Chinese court system. There is no comparable study on the use of contract 
remedies in China. This article attempts to provide information on two core 
issues: (1) how readily do Chinese courts award specific performance for 
breach of contract; and (2) what are the core factors or rationales that 
influence their choice of remedies? An ancillary question to be addressed is 
longitudinal in nature: are changes implemented by the 1999 unification of 
Chinese Contract Law and subsequent developments reflected in judicial 
                                                          
 26 The “law in books” versus “law in action” distinction is longstanding. See Roscoe 
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); see also Jean-Louis 
Halpérin, Law in Books and Law in Action: The Problem of Legal Change, 64 ME. L. REV. 45 
(2011) (analyzing the distinction as discussed by Roscoe Pound and the European legal 
theories that are influenced by the ideas of Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, and Alf Ross about law 
and facts). 
 27 Interestingly, in reformulating a moral argument challenging the instrumentalist view 
of contract remedy in favor of expectation interest, Klass argues that the dual performance 
hypothesis, i.e. to perform or pay damages may not be empirically sound. Gregory Klass, To 
Perform or Pay Damages, 98 VA. L. REV. 143, 158 (2012). 
 28 Wang Li Ming & Xu Chuanxi, Fundamental Principles of China’s Contract Law, 13 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 15 (1999); HAN, supra note 4, at 536-37; Shiyuan Han, Culpa in 
Contrahendo in Chinese Contract Law, 6 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 157, 169 (2013); BING 
LING, CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA 418-26 (2002). 
 29 To the best knowledge of this PI, there is only one empirical study dealing with Chinese 
contract remedies up to now. See Lei Chen, Specific Performance as a Contractual Remedy 
in Chinese Courts: An Empirical Study, 7 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 95 (2019). Another study, 
strictly speaking, is not an empirical study on contract law, but rather on contract behavior. 
See Yifan Hu & Larry D. Qiu, An Empirical Analysis of Contracting by Chinese Firms, 21 
CHINA ECON. REV. 423, 426 (2010) (arguing that firms are more likely to use formal contracts 
as opposed to relational ones if they are located in a city different from the firm’s main 
business location). Different from contract law scholarship in China, there are quite a number 
of empirical studies on contract law in the US. See, e.g., David Baumer & Patricia Marschall, 
Willful Breach of Contract for the Sale of Goods: Can the Bane of Business be an Economic 
Bonanza?, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 159 (1992); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract 
Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998); Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference 
with Contract Versus “Efficient” Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 
131 (1999); Oren Bar-Gill & Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Consent and Exchange, 39 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 375, 397 (2010). 
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practice on remedies for breach of contract? 
III. HISTORY OF CONTRACT LAW AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
IN CHINA 
This part will briefly analyze the modern history of contract law in 
China. The first section moves from the planned economy during the first 
part of the Communist Party rule to the initial entry of China into foreign 
investment and international trade. Under the communist planned economy, 
there was little use for monetary compensation in the private sphere since 
private property rights were not recognized.30 Upon entering the global 
economy and transitioning to a partial market economy, Western-style 
contract laws were enacted, but in a fragmented way.31 The second section 
reviews the unification of Chinese contract law with the enactment of the 
Chinese Contract Law of 1999. The final section examines the role of SP in 
modern Chinese contract law. 
A. Planned Economy and the Economic Contract Law of 1981 
Under the socialistic legal system, SP was viewed as a common remedy 
and was often preferred over damages.32 In some areas, SP was considered 
to be the ordinary remedy and the award of damages as the extraordinary 
remedy.33 Part of the explanation for this reversed prioritization is due to the 
difficulty of the non-breaching party (buyer) to obtain substituted goods in a 
planned economy.34 In China’s planned economy, supply often did not meet 
demand.35 There were no advanced secondary markets for goods and scarcity 
of certain goods was not uncommon.36 An arrangement to purchase goods 
from another supplier could prove difficult and time consuming. As a 
consequence, the goals set by the central economic planners for an enterprise 
could not be achieved because the enterprise received money instead of the 
goods it needs for production.37 Therefore, monetary compensation was an 
inadequate remedy as there were a limited number of suppliers in the market, 
making SP arguably the more efficient remedy. 
                                                          
 30 Wang Li Ming, Specific Performance in Chinese Contract Law: An East-West 
Comparison, 1 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 18, 22 (1992); Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions 
of China’s Reforms and Development, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 1076, 1077-81 (2011). 
 31 Li Ming, supra note 30, at 20. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 19. 
 34 Id. at 22. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Jacques deLisle, China’s Foreign Economic Contract Law and Technology Import 
Regulations, 27 HARV. INT’L L. J. 275, 276 (1986). 
 37 Bernhard Grossfeld, Money Sanctions for Breach of Contract in a Communist 
Economy, 72 YALE L. J. 1326, 1338 (1963) (“[T]he enterprise is liable for the acts of all its 
members in the preparation, execution, and performance of contracts which result in a failure 
to conclude the contract within the time prescribed by the plan . . .”). 
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Against the background of a centralized planned economy, actual 
performance was of paramount importance for every unit of the economy, 
including the courts. Non-performance by one supplier or producer could 
cause a waterfall effect in the supply chain, leading to numerous breaches of 
contracts and missed quotas set by the central plan. The principle of SP was 
accepted as the norm, as it was necessary in order to place the non-breaching 
party in the position that it would have been had the contract been performed. 
The granting of pure compensatory damages was not a proper fit in an 
economy characterized by scarcity of supply, mandated quotas, and the 
affixation of government penalties in cases of not meeting the pre-determined 
quotas.38 
Thus, even when contracting parties had expressly agreed that the SP 
remedy would be waived in favour of monetary compensation, such a 
contract term was often ignored as improperly restricting the Chinese courts’ 
remedial function.39 According to Article 35 of the Economic Contract Law 
(“ECL”), the defaulting party still needed to continue the performance under 
the contract even after damages have been paid, if so demanded by the non-
breaching party.40 This indicates that the payment of damages did not 
necessarily mean that the non-breaching party had waived the remedy of 
SP.41 Monetary compensation was categorically stated to be a remedy of last 
resort in cases where SP is virtually impossible to render.42 Another feature 
of SP in the planned economy era was that where SP was possible, neither 
party may demand, offer, or accept termination instead.43 Further, SP was 
                                                          
 38 The first Western-style or modern contract law detailed the role of the planned contract 
system. Article 11 states: 
For economic dealings involving products and items included in the state mandatory plan, the 
economic contracts must be signed according to the quotas set by the State; if no agreement is 
reached at the time of the signing, the matter shall be dealt with by the planning organ superior 
to both parties. As for economic dealings involving products and items included in the state 
guidance plan, the economic contracts shall be signed according to the actual conditions of the 
units concerned in reference to the quotas set by the State. 
The Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at the fourth session 
of the fifth Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 13, 1981) [hereinafter China Economic Contract Law]. 
 39 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Remedial Clauses: The Overprivatization of Private Law, 67 
HASTINGS L. J. 407, 407 (2016). Professor Shiffrin more broadly makes the case against such 
contract terms: “I contend that the traditional presumption against such clauses enforces 
important values central to the rule of law, including that private parties should not decide 
their own cases and that the public has a special interest in deciding what remedies are 
appropriate for breaches of legal duty.” Id. at 407. 
 40 Li Ming Wang, supra note 30, at 21. (Professor Li Ming Wang notes that the Chinese 
courts at the time gave priority to the specific performance remedy.) China Economic Contract 
Law, supra note 39, at Article 35 (“If the processing work does not [live] up to the required 
quality and quantity stipulated in the contract, it should undertake repairs free of charge, make 
up for the shortage in quantity or, ask for less remuneration depending on the circumstances.”). 
 41 Li Ming, supra note 30, at 21. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Treitel, supra note 7, at 155. 
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available irrespective of the fault of the defaulting party.44 
B. Chinese Contract Law of 1999 
China’s attempt to transition to a partial market economy in the 1980s 
led to the enactment of a series of fragmented contract laws including the 
Economic Contract Law, Foreign Economic Contract Law, and the 
Technology Contract Law.45 In 1988, China acceded to the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (“CISG”).46 
The earlier contract laws were not conducive to uniformity of law and a free 
market system. The adoption of the CISG was a move in the right direction 
since it provided a Western-style model for a uniform sales law and would 
become a source document for the implementation of a uniform Chinese 
contract law. 
When the Chinese Contract Law was drafted in the 1990s, economic 
and social conditions had changed dramatically as China accelerated its 
transformation from a planned economy into a partial-market economy. The 
increased efficiency of the market economy and the privatization of property 
rights allowed supply and demand for goods to be based on free market 
dynamics instead of the inefficient government allocation system under a 
command economy. The result was the growth of secondary markets based 
upon real world supply and demand, which increased the availability of 
purchasing substituted goods in cases of breach of contract. The Chinese 
Contract Law of 1999 was drafted in the context of this transition and the 
increase of market efficiency. 
Thus, the traditional role of SP as a preferred contract remedy gave way 
to SP being considered as one of the standard contractual remedies. In sum, 
SP’s place in contract law’s remedial structure radically changed from the 
default or preferred remedy to just another contractual remedy.47 The 
question remained whether the growth of a market economy and the adoption 
of a more modern contract law would lead to SP becoming a secondary 
remedy to the awarding of contract damages. 
C. Specific Performance Under Modern Chinese Contract Law 
The primary legislative sources of Chinese contract law are the General 
                                                          
 44 Weiguo Wang, On Specific Performance, 3 STUD. L. 17 (1984). 
 45 See China Economic Contract Law, supra note 39; Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Foreign-Related Economic Contracts (effective July 1, 1985) [hereinafter CFECL]; 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Technology Contracts (effective Nov. 11, 1997) 
[hereinafter CTCL]. 
 46 CISG, supra note 7. The full text of the CISG is available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html. The CISG is 
now the law of ninety-one countries. The status of signatories to the Convention is listed at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html (last 
accessed July 16, 2019). 
 47 Availability of Specific Remedies, supra note 20, at 23-25. 
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Principles of Civil Law of 1986 (GPCL) and the Chinese Contract Law 
(CCL) of 1999.48 The GPCL, albeit vague, broadly covers property rights, 
contractual obligations, intellectual property rights, marital rights, unjust 
enrichment, tort liability, and legal remedies. The CCL is the most 
comprehensive and specific statute on contracts in China. In practice, since 
the statutes are abstract and incomplete, the GPCL and the CCL are 
supplemented by governmental regulations and judicial interpretations of the 
Supreme People’s Court (SPC). The courts, especially the SPC, play an 
influential role in spelling out concrete rules concerning contractual disputes. 
There are two judicial interpretations on contract law issued by the SPC, 
namely, Interpretation Numbers I and II.49 Judicial interpretations serve as 
the “most important and active interpretation authority in China . . .”50 
Judicial interpretations issued by the SPC, although not directly binding on 
the courts, are sometimes referred to as “quasi-legislation.”51 
Under Chinese law, in cases of breach of contract or failure to cure 
defective performance within the requisite period of time, the aggrieved party 
is entitled to either: (1) a claim for specific performance, or (2) the 
cancellation of the contract. In either case, the non-breaching party is also 
entitled to make a claim for damages.52 Article 107 of the CCL states that 
“[w]here a party fails to perform his contractual obligations or where his 
performance of the contractual obligations is not in conformity with the 
agreement, he shall bear liability for breach of contract by continuing his 
performance, taking remedial measures, paying damages and so forth.” This 
provision indicates that after a breach or failure to perform, the breaching 
party still has the duty of “continuing his performance,” as well as paying 
damages.53 Article 112 provides that where a party fails to perform its 
obligations under the contract or its performance fails to conform to the 
contract, and the other party suffers further damages after the performance of 
                                                          
 48 General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China [Revised] (1986 
General Provisions) (promulgated by the National People’s Congress Apr. 12, 1986, effective 
Jan. 1, 1987, as amended by the Decision of the NPC Standing Committee on Amending 
Some Laws (promulgated Aug. 27, 2009)) [hereinafter GPCL]; China Economic Contract 
Law, supra note 41, at art. 58. 
 49 Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning the Application of 
the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (II) (promulgated by the Jud. Committee 




 50 JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF CHINESE LAW, ITS 
NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT 108 (1999). 
 51 LING, supra note 28, at 32. These are general model decisions that attempt to clarify 
the statutory law and are considered part and parcel of the legislation, much like the comments 
found in the United States’ Uniform Commercial Code. 
 52 HAN, supra note 4, at 775. 
 53 CCL, supra note 4, at art. 107. 
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the obligation or adoption of remedial measures, the breaching party shall 
compensate the other party for such damages.54 It is notable that the key 
consideration in determining whether damages and SP can be concurrently 
awarded is whether SP would cause over-compensation to the non-breaching 
party.55 Article 110 notes that the non-breaching party has the right to 
demand performance, but qualifies it in cases where “the subject matter of 
the obligation is unsuitable for enforced performance or the cost of 
performance would be excessively high.”56 
Some scholars argue that SP takes precedence in the hierarchy of 
remedies since it is listed first in Article 107.57 Others maintain that there is 
no hierarchical preference between damages and specific performance given 
the fact that both appear in the same sentence.58 While SP is not expressly 
stated to be a primary remedy in China, it is, as a matter of principle, 
generally available as an option for aggrieved parties.59 Nonetheless, this 
does not necessarily mean that Chinese courts readily issue judicial orders 
for SP.60 
On the surface, the complaining party has the right to choose the remedy 
of SP over damages. However, courts retain a degree of discretion whether 
to issue an order of SP. In Chinese law, there are generally recognized 
limitations on the remedy of specific performance: excuse or exemption 
(impossibility or force majeure), contracts for personal services, untimely 
claim, and, most importantly, where the costs of performance outweigh the 
benefits received by the promisee.61 The latter ground of discretion is known 
as the disproportionality limitation and “is a manifestation of the principle of 
good faith.”62 The disproportionality principle provides courts the discretion 
to consider benefits and costs. Also, damages are awarded when SP is 
impossible, impractical, or excessive, when the creditor does not request SP 
within a reasonable period of time63 or contravenes the good faith principle 
because of her failure to mitigate64, in cases of the debtor’s hardship arising 
                                                          
 54 CCL, supra note 4, at art. 112. 
 55 HAN, supra note 4, at 774. 
 56 CCL, supra note 4, at. art. 110 (2). 
 57 WANG LI MING [王利明], HE TONG FA YAN JIU [STUDY ON CONTRACT LAW 合同法研究
] 557 (2011). 
 58 HAN, supra note 4, at 316. 
 59 This approach has been adopted even before the 1999 Contract Law. The GPCL and 
the other two pieces of pre-1999 contract legislation had made such a choice. See GPCL, supra 
note 49, at art. 111 (China); CFECL, supra note 46, at art.18; CTCL, supra note 46, at art. 
17(1). 
 60 Availability of Specific Remedies, supra note 20, at 21. 
 61 CCL, supra note 4, at art. 110. 
 62 Availability of Specific Remedies, supra note 20, at 29. 
 63 CCL, supra note 4, at art. 110(2). 
 64 GPCL, supra note 49, at art. 114 and CCL, supra note 4, at art. 119 (1) enunciate the 
rule of mitigation. This rule stipulates that the aggrieved party shall take prompt and 
reasonable measures to prevent further losses. If the measures are not taken, the aggrieved 
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from a change of circumstances65, or for administrative considerations. Thus, 
the restrictions to the rule of general availability are as significant as the rule 
itself. 
In sum, Chinese formal law does provide a hierarchy between the 
remedies of damages and specific performance. So, theoretically, the non-
breaching party has the option of seeking damages or SP, or both. However, 
a petition for a SP order is not automatically approved since the courts still 
retain discretion on whether to provide such a remedy. The question remains: 
“[h]ow readily do Chinese courts award SP for breach and what factors 
influence the choice of remedy in their awards?”66 There are two dimensions 
to framing an answer to this question—the judicial perspective and the 
plaintiff’s perspective. The courts may accept the law that the remedies of 
damages and SP are on par, but this does not mean that the courts view SP as 
a preferred remedy or as the default remedy. From the perspective of the 
aggrieved party, damages have been the most common remedy sought due to 
the additional costs associated with enforcing an order of SP.67 
Another issue that plays a role in the use of SP is the Chinese law on the 
enforceability of penalty clauses. Liquidated damages or penalty provisions 
are ubiquitous in Chinese contract practice. The difference between Chinese 
and American practices is that penalties are unenforceable under American 
law,68 while they are enforceable under Chinese law.69 Since penalties are 
enforceable in China, the non-breaching party may receive supra-
                                                          
party is not entitled to request compensation for any further loss. 
 65 See Gordon Y.M. Chan, The Doctrine of Change of Circumstances in Chinese Contract 
Law 3 (Sep. 28, 2011), (unpublished paper, Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong 
Kong) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1934085) (this interpretation formalized the 
“change of circumstance” to exempt parties from continued performance of contract, a term 
first mentioned in China in the case of Wuhan Gas Co. v. Chongqing Detection Instrument 
Plant in 1992.). 
 66 Lei Chen, Damages and Specific Performance in Chinese Contract Law, in CHINESE 
CONTRACT LAW: CIVIL AND COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVES 378 (Larry DiMatteo & Lei Chen 
eds., 2018). 
 67 Id. at 379. (“The reality is that even though specific performance is generally available 
(on a par with damages) to the claimants as a remedy, it is rarely sought due to practical 
concerns.”). 
 68 Common law historian Theodore F.T. Plucknett traces the role of equity in the 
formation of the penalty rule to a 1309 case in which the court reasoned that “this is not 
properly a debt but a penalty; and with what equity can you demand this penalty?” THEODORE 
F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 677 (5th ed. 1956). RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981), Comment b states: 
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at 
an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by 
the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large 
liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty. 
See, e.g., In re A.J. Lane & Co., Inc., 113 B.R. 821, 828 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (A penalty 
must be voided “even when the transaction is fully voluntary and the parties have equal 
bargaining power.”). 
 69 Chen, supra note 67, at 394-96. 
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compensatory damages70 that likely diminish the appeal of SP. An 
explanation of the causal relationship between penalties, compensatory 
damages, and SP is the nature of recoverable damages. If damages were truly 
compensatory, then the non-breaching party should be indifferent to whether 
it receives damages or SP. Given the other costs related to the enforcement 
of SP, the preferred remedy from the plaintiff’s perspective should be 
damages. However, if compensatory damages do not cover the actual harm, 
which may include inconvenience, loss of productivity, non-recoverable 
legal costs, and emotional stress, then SP should be the preferred remedy.71 
Finally, if penalties allow for the collection of full compensatory damages 
and possibly more, then the enforcement of the penalty clause would be 
preferred over SP. In a sense, penalties act as a SP substitute.72 Unfortunately, 
the empirical survey was unable to capture the nature of the interrelationships 
between damages, penalties, and SP. 
IV. EMPIRICAL SURVEY OF CHINESE JUDGES 
Unlike previous works, which focused primarily on doctrinal analyses 
of black letter law,73 this project undertakes an empirical examination of the 
judicial practice of granting SP in China. It questions whether SP is a 
common remedy granted in most types of cases. Alternatively, if in 
practice SP is not given as an ordinary remedy, then in what types of cases 
will the courts make an order of SP available? What factors or criteria do 
the Chinese courts assess when deciding to grant SP? 
This article tests the “convergence” theory74 through an empirical 
survey administered to judges in China. To be specific, this project aims to 
explore the following research questions: 
 
(1) How often do Chinese courts use SP as a remedy for contract breaches? 
                                                          
 70 Ibid. Contract law damages are based upon compensating the non-breaching party for 
harm caused by the breach based on the expectancy interest (putting the party in the place in 
the future that they would have been but for the breach). Therefore, damages that are supra-
compensatory would be punitive in nature, which is not allowed in the common law, but is 
enforceable in the civil law and, therefore, under the Chinese civil law system. 
 71 Jeffrey Standen, The Fallacy of Full Compensation, 73 WASH. U.L.R. 145, 225 (1995) 
(“The available remedial means of ensuring full compensation, such as injunctions, specific 
performance and restitution, are issued at a price, not just to the defendant, but also to the 
community . . .”). 
 72 See Larry A. DiMatteo, Penalties as Rational Response to Bargaining Irrationality, 
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 883, 890 (2006). 
 73 LI MING, supra note 4; HAN, supra note 4. 
 74 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd. [1998] AC 1 (HL) 
11-12 (appeal taken from AC). Again, the convergence theory holds that the civil and common 
law remedies have been converging overtime. The analysis presented here shows that Chinese 
courts are not indifferent between the remedies of damages and to SP. In fact, they frugally 
use the remedy of SP, more so than in the common law, but not as robustly is allowed in civil 
law. 
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It is predicted that the empirical survey will show that SP is granted far 
less frequently than commonly assumed. In common law terminology, 
the survey should show that SP is not an ordinary remedy as represented 
in Chinese contract law, but in practice it is viewed and applied as an 
extraordinary remedy. 
(2) What are the factors that are most predictive of judges’ likelihood of 
granting SP? Relatedly, do Chinese courts respect the parties’ ex ante 
specification of their preferences for SP or damages? 
(3) If the study finds that SP is awarded infrequently, what are the 
underlying reasons or rationales given for its underutilization? Are there 
organizational, professional, or individual reasons that restrict the use 
of SP as an ordinary remedy? 
(4) Further, are defendants more amenable to paying damages, sometimes 
damages higher than normal or compensatory damages where it appears 
the claimant has an objectively high probability of obtaining an order of 
SP? Does the probability of obtaining SP anchor settlement 
negotiations? 
These questions seek to compare the ‘law in the books’ (SP as primary 
remedy) to the ‘law in action.’75 The survey hopes to determine whether SP 
is used more frugally despite the legal right of the buyer to choose the 
remedy. The common law has had a modest degree of influence on Chinese 
contract law. If frugality is found, does the use of SP in China signal a civil 
law-common law hybrid or convergence of the views of civil and common 
law thinking on SP? 
A questionnaire was constructed in order to obtain a dataset of Chinese 
judges’ perspectives concerning remedies for contract breaches.76 The 
findings are critical to understanding the status of the SP remedy in contract 
enforcement in Chinese courts, as they continue to transition from a 
customary law system to the application of Western-style laws. The analysis 
also offers an innovative perspective to observe contract remedies and to 
understand the institutional dynamics and constraints in shaping the 
performance interests of contracting parties.77 
The sections below describe the research objectives of the empirical 
study of judicial attitudes toward the granting of specific performance. It 
provides a list of questions and assumptions that were brought to the survey 
effort and explains the characteristics and size of the survey sample. Finally, 
it discusses the scope and limitations of the research and reports on its 
                                                          
 75 See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 272 (“Under current law, courts grant specific 
performance when they perceive that damages will be inadequate compensation. Specific 
performance is deemed an extraordinary remedy . . .”). 
 76 See infra Part III.C. 
 77 See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. 
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findings. 
A. Research Objectives 
The function of contractual remedies is to place the non-breaching 
promisee in as good a position as if the promisor performed,78 or to “make 
the victim of a breach whole.”79 The “performance interest” forms the very 
basis for a contract between parties and underpins the structure of contractual 
remedies.80 There are two primary types of remedies available. The first 
requires the defaulting party to pay monetary compensation, either to enable 
the aggrieved party to purchase a substitute performance, or to compensate it 
for lost profits and other incidental damages causally related to the breach.81 
If the non-breaching party is fully compensated, then the party is theoretically 
placed in the position that it would otherwise have been but for the breach. 
The second major remedy requires the defaulting party to render the actual 
performance as was promised. The former is known as legal damages while 
the latter is referred to as SP. SP requires that when a party to a contract does 
not perform an agreed obligation, by not delivering goods or delivering 
defective goods, the other party can request the court to order the party in 
breach to perform according to the terms of the contract.82 The party in breach 
is required to undertake what it previously promised in the contract, albeit 
often at a later point in time than originally agreed upon. 
Doctrinally, while the common law world favors awarding damages 
over ordering SP, civil law systems still endorse SP as a primary remedy.83 
This has been challenged by some empirical studies, which maintain that 
                                                          
 78 Schwartz, supra note 19, at 271. 
 79 Shavell, supra note 12, at 831. 
 80 See Daniel Friedmann, Performance Interest in Contract Damages, 111 L. QUARTERLY 
REV. 628 (1995). 
 81 There are three generic limitations to damage recovery: (1) the damages must have been 
foreseeable at the time of contracting; (2) the breaching party is not liable for damages that 
would have been avoided through a reasonable mitigation; and (3) the injured party must prove 
its damages with certainty. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, at 873-74. 
 82 Being aware of the difficulty in having a consensual definition among different legal 
systems, this author attempts to provide this Chinese version, which hopefully is as 
understandable as possible for foreign scholars. 
 83 In the common law of remedies, damages were obtained in the royal or government 
courts, while non-damage remedies or equitable remedies, such as specific performance and 
injunction, were within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical or equity courts. When the court 
systems merged the common law marinated the distinction between legal remedy and 
equitable remedy. The legal remedy (damages) was considered the ordinary remedy, while 
equitable remedies were considered extraordinary, to be used when damages were deemed to 
be inadequate. Damages are considered to be inadequate when the subject matter of a contract 
is deemed to be unique, such as in the sale of real property. Kronman, supra note 17, at 351; 
Dawson, supra note 7, at 495; PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) FULL EDITION, supra note 3, at 
825; PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: PARTS I AND II, supra note 3, at 397-98; 
Miller, supra note 3, at 288-89; Herman, supra note 7, at 6-7. 
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different legal systems have reached similar results in practice.84 This 
argument of the convergence of legal traditions asserts that in practice, there 
is less difference between the common law and civilian systems than these 
general doctrinal statements might suggest.85 Nonetheless, Douglas Laycock 
concludes that when a court denies equitable relief such as SP, its real reasons 
are derived from the interests of parties or the legal system, not from the 
adequacy of the plaintiff’s legal remedy.86 This assertion implies that the 
rates at which SP is awarded are not as low as common law doctrine would 
suggest. Steven Shavell argues that parties would tend to prefer the remedy 
of damages for breach of contracts to produce things due to high transaction 
costs, whereas they would often favor the remedy of SP for breach of 
contracts to convey property.87 The supervision costs of SP for the transfer 
of existing property is minimal. In contrast, the supervision costs would be 
high if SP is for the production of custom goods.88 Shavell submits that SP 
in the latter case would, in many cases, result in a joint loss for the contracting 
parties.89 
Under Shavell’s analysis, if goods already exist then SP makes 
economic sense, but when goods are yet to be produced (especially in high-
cost production) SP would be an inefficient remedy. However, if there were 
no readily available substitute goods, then SP for the production of goods 
may be preferred. In other words, parties dealing with different categories of 
contracts prefer different remedies, which makes commercial sense. Shavell 
correctly observes that the main purpose of SP, at least in the common law, 
is in cases where the remedy of damages proves to be inadequate.90 This 
would be in cases where compensatory damages are difficult to calculate or 
the performance is difficult to value, cases where obtaining substitute goods 
                                                          
 84 Lando & Rose, supra note 3. 
 85 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1998] AC 1 (HL) 
11-12. 
 86 Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 
771 (1990). 
 87 Shavell, supra note 12, at 859 (“[L]egal outcomes seem broadly consistent with the 
economic theory in the important sense that specific performance appears to be employed as 
a remedy primarily for breach of contracts to convey property rather than of contracts to 
produce things or to provide services.”). 
 88 Id. at 846 (“[R]easons suggesting that parties to a contract to produce something would 
prefer expectation damages to specific performance as the remedy for breach, since use of 
specific performance would tend to lower joint value and impose risk on the seller relative to 
use of the expectation measure.”). 
 89 Shavell, supra note 12, at 860. Shavell states that “problems in supervision would be 
associated with a loss in joint value for the parties (because they would bear some of the costs 
of supervision and because the performance itself might be poor).” 
 90 Id at 854 n.62 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 350 cmt. c, 360 cmt. 
c (1981)) (“[I]t is often possible for the injured party to secure goods or services similar to 
those in the contract by looking elsewhere in the market and that if these are available, the 
damage remedy is usually adequate; however, if the goods or services are unique, the injured 
party is more likely to be granted specific performance.”). 
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proves to be difficult, and cases where the breaching party is unable to pay 
compensatory damages (and the goods are attachable).91 This schematic of 
the efficient application of SP will later be applied to the findings of the 
empirical survey.92 
B. Questions and Assumptions 
Previous scholarship on SP has provided a certain degree of coherence 
to the availability of SP under Chinese law.93 The goal of the current 
undertaking is to empirically determine the use and availability of SP in 
judicial practice. The goal of the study is to analyze the legal or judicial 
prevalence and attitude towards SP. The empirical survey of judicial attitudes 
towards SP will show how the taxonomy of the underlying contract dispute 
influences the courts’ remedial choices.94 A taxonomy of contracts involves 
the categorization or grouping of contracts based on transaction types, such 
as sales of goods, sales of real property, licensing, leasing, construction, and 
so forth. The survey also hopes to uncover whether there is a pattern where 
judges actively attempt to persuade a claimant to change a claim for SP to a 
claim for damages. To this end, the following set of assumptions and 
corresponding research questions will be tested and explored. 
1. How often do Chinese courts award SP in cases of contract breach? 
The comparative contract law theory holds that civil law systems favor 
or are more likely to order SP (than the common law, which gives damage 
awards priority), but is this true for China?95 Will the evidence show that civil 
law’s non-hierarchical view of damages and SP (equally available to 
plaintiffs) is replicated in judicial practice? Or will the evidence show that 
SP is seldom awarded, thereby supporting the view that Chinese contract 
remedies are a hybrid system somewhere between the civil and common laws 
as represented by convergence theory? It is expected that the data sample will 
empirically show how frequently Chinese judges award SP in commercial 
and civil disputes. To measure the robustness of SP as a remedy, a series of 
questions asked Chinese quota judges96 to list the percentage of claims for 
                                                          
 91 Id. at 859. 
 92 See infra Part IV.F. 
 93 Availability of Specific Remedies,  supra note 20. 
 94 Lei Chen, Specific Performance as a Contractual Remedy in Chinese Courts: An 
Empirical Study, 7 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 95, 112 (2019). 
 95 Herman, supra note 7, at 6-7. 
 96 In November 2017, Justice Zhou Qiang (周强), President of the SPC, announced the 
third-round judicial reform (“this reform”) in the “Report of the SPC on the Comprehensive 
Deepening of Judicial Reform by the People’s Court” (最高人民法院关于人民法院全面深
化司法改革情况的报告) available at http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiang qing-66802.html. 
As a concrete initiative on the professionalization of Chinese judges in this judicial reform, 
the SPC established the Quota Judge System. The Quota Judge System aims to divide court 
personnel into three categories: judges, trial assistants and judicial administrative personnel, 
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which SP was granted. Other questions in the questionnaire, listed below, 
were aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of the factors used by courts 
in deciding whether to grant SP, as well as factors that are predictive of a 
court not granting SP. 
2. What are the controlling or predictive factors that influence judges’ 
decision to award SP? Do courts respect the parties’ ex ante 
specification in their contract as to preferred remedy? 
Under Chinese law, as a general rule, a party may have a choice in 
requesting what it deems as an appropriate remedy, but this choice is subject 
to the court’s discretion, taking into account the circumstances of each 
individual case.97 Nonetheless, Chinese judicial practice encourage judges to 
adopt an activist stance in persuading claimants to change the choice of 
remedy before the court hearing if they find no compelling reason to award 
SP. 98 Thus, the evidence should indicate that Chinese judges take a far more 
proactive posture in the preliminary stages of a case than what is commonly 
believed. 
To examine these questions, we shall inquire as to whether judges 
actively arrange and recognize taxonomy of contract types when considering 
an award of SP. We suspect that where a judge actively considers taxonomy 
of contracts, she is more likely to take a proactive stance in considering the 
various remedies available to the claimant at the preliminary stages of a 
claim. For example, where the commonly regarded taxonomy of contracts 
indicates a claimant is in a dispute involving a category of contract where SP 
is commonly awarded, such as in real estate sale contracts, then a judge will 
defer to the claimant in its choice of the remedy of SP. 
In some circumstances—such as instances where the underlying dispute 
falls into certain categories of contracts that are seldom awarded SP, for 
example a partnership agreement—consulting taxonomy of contracts might 
convince a judge to deny the use of SP. The survey asks judges about such 
circumstances and whether they ever consider actively persuading a claimant 
to claim damages even though SP was requested in the preliminary summons 
(complaint). The interplay between the act of consulting taxonomy of 
contracts and deciding to persuade claimants to change their claim for SP to 
a claim of damages will be explored with particular interest. 
3. If SP is seldom awarded, what are the underlying reasons or rationales 
for its frugal use? Under what circumstances is the remedy of SP likely 
                                                          
and to ascertain the number of judges. Consequently, only the judges in the assigned quota in 
each court are allowed to hear the case and they are called quota judges. 
 97 CCL, supra note 4, at art. 107. 
 98 The system of judicial engagement of the parties pre-hearing to settle on the appropriate 
remedy originated from the German civil procedure system of Aufklärung. See Some 
Measures Concerning Civil Proofs (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, effective 
April 1, 2002), at art. 35. 
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to be granted and under what circumstances will its use be restricted? 
Again, the starting point of Chinese Contract Law distinguishes 
between monetary obligations (paying a sum of money)99 and non-monetary 
obligations.100 With regard to monetary obligations, Article 109 stipulates 
that: “where a party fails to pay the price or remuneration, the other party 
may demand him to pay the price or remuneration.”101 For non-monetary 
obligations, a party is entitled to enforce specific performance of a non-
monetary obligation if requested in a timely manner.102 The statutory 
limitations, as noted earlier,103 on the availability of SP include impossibility, 
disproportionality, good faith, and untimely claims are described in detail in 
Article 110 of the CCL.104 
In addressing this research question, the survey aims to look beyond the 
statutory limitations above and taxonomy of contracts to investigate other 
factors that might influence a judge to opt against awarding SP. Our objective 
here is to query judges on their opinion regarding the supervision costs of 
enforcement and whether it features prominently in a judge’s ultimate 
decision to award SP. This line of inquiry seeks to test Shavell’s hypothesis 
that transaction costs play a pivotal role in determining the request and 
granting of SP.105 We hypothesize that transaction costs are an important but 
not pivotal factor in the courts determination to preclude awarding SP. 
Nonetheless, supervision costs are expected to be a factor among non-
transactional cost factors and is an appropriate consideration to determine the 
degree of its influence. 
4. Will defendants be more amenable to settling for damages where it 
appears that the claimant has a plausible likelihood of obtaining SP? 
Court-annexed mediation is a popular practice in Chinese courts, since 
it is used as a key performance indicator of the effectiveness of judges.106 
Since judges encourage parties to settle their disputes, it would be interesting 
to examine how the active settlement system affects the award of SP in 
China. The objective here is to enquire as to the frequency in which 
                                                          
 99 CCL, supra note 4, at art. 109. 
 100 Id. art. 110: 
(1) Performance would be legally or objectively impossible; (2) the subject matter of the 
obligation is unsuitable for enforced performance or performance would be unreasonably 
expensive; or (3) the aggrieved party fails to enforce specific performance within a reasonable 
time after the creditor has become, or could reasonably be expected to have become, aware of 
the non-performance. 
 101 CCL, supra note 4, at art. 109. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. art. 53-56 and accompanying text. 
 104 Availability of Specific Remedies, supra note 20. 
 105 See supra notes 88 & 90 and accompanying text. 
 106 Cai Yanmin, Case Management in China’s Civil Justice System, in 39 CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN CHINA AND EUROPE (van Rhee & Yulin eds., 2014). 
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defendants across every level of the Chinese court system (Trial, 
Intermediate, and the High Court) elect to settle for damages where it appears 
that the claimant has an objectively real chance of being awarded SP. The 
survey also seeks to examine trends in individual courts. 
Vigorously exploring each of these questions is critical to understanding 
the relative status of SP and damages as remedies for breach of contract. The 
findings will be important to litigants, lawyers, and judges. And since 
remedies support the contractual obligation itself, understanding remedies is 
important for commerce more generally. From a normative perspective, the 
research findings will shed light on the debate over whether one remedy is 
superior to the other (allowing for the possibility that one remedy is better in 
certain cases, while the other is better in other cases). Finally, it is especially 
important to study these questions in contemporary China as the research 
findings can be used to construct recommendations for statutory reform. 
C. Survey Sample 
A questionnaire pertaining to SP containing 13 questions was 
administered to 400 quota judges within the Mainland Chinese court 
system.107 The questionnaires included 12 multiple-choice questions and one 
question asking the judges to estimate the percentage of cases where a 
defendant elected to settle their case when an order of SP was likely. Overall, 
the questionnaires were drafted to ascertain a range of data regarding judges’ 
general attitudes toward SP and to indicate whether judges preferred 
damages, as opposed to SP, when a claim could ostensibly merit either. 
To ensure that the sample was representative of the judicial population, 
the questionnaires were randomly sent to judges across a variety and levels 
of courts in distinct geographical and cultural provinces of Mainland China. 
The questionnaires were sent to randomly selected High Court judges at the 
Provincial level with jurisdiction to hear civil and commercial disputes. The 
sample included courts in economically developed areas such as Guangdong, 
Shandong, and Beijing to the less economically developed areas such as 
Inner Mongolia, Huanan, and Guangxi.108 Additionally, every attempt was 
made to obtain data from each level of the court system in these disparate 
regions. The methodology necessitated that the survey include only quota 
judges. The assumption was that the new quota judges possessed greater 
expertise and legal knowledge than judges appointed prior to reforms of the 
                                                          
 107 The Supreme People’s Court, pursuant to their stated aims of improving the 
professionalism of court personnel, instituted reforms regarding the selection and appointment 
system of judges. There “are nine selection and appointment steps”, the completion of which 
will see judges selected to become quota judges based on merits. Judicial Reform of Chinese 
Courts, The Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 3, 2016, 
www.english.court.gov.cn. 
 108 The ten provinces/autonomous regions are Guangdong, Guangxi, Shandong, Beijing, 
Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Hainan, Shanxi, Anhui, and Guizhou. 
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judiciary.109 The use of quota judges also ensured a more robust comparison 
across different geographical locations given the distinct population of 
judges sampled. The power of the statistical analysis was ensured with an 
ultimate data set of almost 400 returned questionnaires. 
The high response rate was likely due to the simplicity of the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was intentionally drafted to be brief while 
also being legally compelling. Thus, the final questionnaire could be 
completed quickly but also offered the judges an opportunity to engage 
intellectually in order to encourage a serious level of thought. 
The questionnaire was drafted in Chinese and subsequently translated 
into English. The questions translated into English are as follows: 
 
(1) What is the length of your tenure as a judge? 
(2) In what level of court do you currently preside? 
(3) How many cases of contractual breach have you handled within your 
capacity as a judge (presiding judge or member of a judicial panel)? 
(4) Would you ever consider awarding SP where the claimant did not 
request a SP order in its complaint? 
(5) Do you know of any instances where a SP order was made by one of 
your colleagues without a clear SP request by the claimant in its 
pleadings? 
(6) Taking into account all of the contractual breach cases you have 
presided over, in what percentage would you say SP was awarded? 
(7) Have you ever considered attempting to persuade the claiming party 
to change a claim for SP to a claim for damages? 
(8) In your experience, do you find a need to address the type of contract 
and its subject matter when deciding whether or not to grant a SP 
order? 
(9) Do the supervision costs of enforcement factor related to SP weigh 
heavily in making your decisions on the appropriate remedy? 
(10) If you were the judge presiding over the scenarios below, how likely 
would you be to award SP? Please indicate your reasoning: 
a. D agreed to pay P to advertise his business on rubbish bins; P 
has a contract to supply the bins to the local government for the 
period of three years. Before the advertisement was applied to 
the bins, D tried to cancel the contract, but P refused and 
continued with the advertisement campaign in order to demand 
                                                          
 109 The quota system came into existence in 2016, which raised the qualifications needed 
to become a judge. 
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payment on the contract. 
b. D agreed to sell his apartment to P. After concluding the 
property sale contract, D refused to complete the performance 
because D found another buyer who was willing to pay a higher 
price. P sued D for SP. 
(11) In your experience, when the claimant requests a SP order, how often 
do you find that the defendant works to settle the case before the 
possible issuance of a decree of SP? Please indicate a percentage (0-
100%). 
(12) If the parties included a liquidated damages provision in their 
contract, would this affect your decision to award SP? Please explain 
your reasoning. 
Questionnaires that were largely incomplete or illegible were discarded 
in order or to properly utilize a regression analysis. Due to the large amount 
of incomplete questionnaires, no attempt was made to compute a propensity 
score or perform a multiple imputation analysis. Nonetheless, the completed 
questionnaires provided a robust sample size of 373 data inputs. Also, the 
sample size for each of the three levels of the court system was significant. 












Trial 244 6 n121 n117 
Intermediate 62 10 n 4 n48 
High Court 94 9 n39 n46 
Total 400 25 n164 n211 
 
In sum, the survey sample provides a critical mass of data to ensure 
statistical power. The sample size using semi-completed questionnaires not 
excluded for being mostly incomplete or illegible totaled 373 spread across 
three levels of the court system as follows: 236 from Trial Courts, 52 from 
Intermediate Appeals Courts, and 85 from High Courts. The appellate cases 
combined (Intermediate and High Courts) totaled 137. This included in-
person interviews of judges by the investigator, which are discussed below. 
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D. Methodology 
This statistical data analysis and contextual examination sought to 
investigate the prevalence of SP (in lieu of damages) as a contractual remedy 
in civil and commercial disputes among the three levels of the Mainland 
Chinese court system. This section provides a concise explanation of the 
basic statistical methodology (quantitative analysis) and the context of 
interviews conducted as part of the research (qualitative analysis). 
As for the contextual examination, Mainland Chinese judges were 
interviewed over the course of the years 2014-2017 at an annual training 
program offered at the City University of Hong Kong. The interviewees were 
judges who specifically deal with civil and commercial disputes. The judges 
came from all three levels of court, and were from ten geographically diverse 
provinces. Information obtained directly from judges provides important 
insights into the perceptions, experiences, and approaches of judges to the 
remedy of SP in any given case. In addition, the face-to-face interviews 
allowed the researchers to identify a variety of factors—organizational, 
professional, legal and personal, which affect judicial decision-making in this 
area. The interviewer, Lei Chen, previously participated in two Supreme 
People’s Court sponsored examination panels on the availability of SP in 
Beijing Mentougou Trial Court and the Civil Tribunal No 1 of the SPC. Thus, 
he posed an in-depth understanding of how Chinese courts view the 
availability of SP across different categories of commercial disputes. 
Excerpts from some of the interviews will be used to highlight certain 
findings since the non-verbal responses of the interviewees cannot captured 
by the regression analysis. 
Many of the objectives of the research were addressed with hypothesis 
testing and parameter estimation; the parameter of interest is the Odds Ratio 
(“OR”).110 The hypothesis testing determined whether sufficient evidence 
existed to suggest a rejection of the null hypothesis of no association.111 With 
regard to addressing the association between the response Q7 and the 
response to another question, say QX, the null hypothesis states that the 
likelihood of a ‘Yes’ response to Q7 does not vary with the response to QX 
or that the response to QX does not vary with the response to Q7. 
                                                          
 110 The Odds Ratio (“OR”) is defined as “a measure of association between an exposure 
and an outcome. The OR represents the odds that an outcome will occur given a particular 
exposure, compared to the odds of that outcome occurring in the absence of that exposure.” 
Magdalena Szumilas, Explaining Odds Ratios, J. CAN. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 
227-29 (2010). 
 111 In general, the magnitude of association between two events EA and EB is measured 
with the OR defined as a ratio of odds of event EA to the odds of EB, where the odds of EA, for 
example, is the ratio of the probability PA that EA will occur divided by the probability 1-PA 
that EA will not occur, PA/(1-PA), and the OR is PA/(1-PA) divided by PB/(1-PB) and OR=1 if 
and only if PA=PB. The 95% confidence interval (CI) for the OR is an interval that contains 
the true OR with 95% probability. We show both the OR and its 95% CI. In theory the CI will 
contain 1 if and only if the p-value of the test statistic is > 0.05. 
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Much of our statistical testing was carried out using the Fisher’s Exact 
Test112, logistic regression and analysis of variance, as appropriate, with p-
values and supporting statistics for each method. The p-value is the 
likelihood of observing data inconsistent with the null hypothesis; a smaller 
p-value indicates increased evidence that the null is not true. A p-value less 
than 0.05 is considered ‘statistically significant,’ suggesting that the data was 
unlikely (with probability <0.05) to have occurred purely by chance if the 
null is in fact true. Therefore, the discussion will revolve largely around those 
responses that are statistically significant (with probability <0.05). However, 
other data that is notable will also be discussed regardless of its statistical 
significance. 
It should be noted that the statistical significance of variation in the 
mean value of Q11 (“In your experience, when the claimant requests a SP 
order, how often do you find that the defendant works to settle the case before 
the possible issuance of a decree of SP?”) was assessed with analysis of 
variance and a Tuckey correction for pairwise court contrasts. Data is 
summarized with the mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and 
maximum by court and pairwise contrasts are summarized with the mean 
difference, its standard error and a 95% confidence interval for the mean 
difference.113 All statistical testing was two-sided with a nominal or 
experiment wide significance level of 5%.114 
E. Scope and Limitations of Research  
It is important to underscore the fact that a judicial survey of the Chinese 
courts has rarely been attempted. Not surprisingly, the research project faced 
some considerable limitations. At the outset, all the information had to be 
gathered to create an entirely new dataset without access to any existing 
databases. Perhaps more importantly, given that the emphasis was on 
contractual remedies, the surveys were only sent to judges dealing with civil 
and commercial legal matters. As a result, the pool of judges that satisfied 
the survey requirements was noticeably constrained. In an effort to ensure an 
adequate sample size, we elected to survey all three levels of the Chinese 
court system. However, even this proved to be a challenge. In the vast 
province of Guangdong, for example, the Guangdong High Court has about 
one hundred judges presiding over the entire region and only forty-seven of 
those judges preside over civil and commercial disputes. 115 Fortunately, the 
survey response rate was a robust 47 % (22 of 47).116 
                                                          
 112 JOHN H. MCDONALD, Fisher’s Exact Test of Independence, in HANDBOOK OF 
BIOLOGICAL STATISTICS 78-80 (3d ed. 2014). 
 113 RAMON C. LITTELL, GEORGE A. MILLIKEN, WALTER W. STROUP, RUSSELL D. 
WOLFINGER & OLIVER SCHABENBERGER, SAS FOR MIXED MODELS 22-25 (2d ed. 2006). 
 114 SAS Version 9.4 for Windows was used throughout. 
 115 See details at the official website of Guangdong High People’s Court at 
http://www.gdcourts.gov.cn/ index.php?v=listing&cid=70 (last visited Jan. 31, 2020). 
 116 Id. 
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F. Statistical Findings 
The following section details the statistical findings and provides a 
concise interpretation presented in the corresponding tables. As with the 
preceding section, these explanations will provide an encompassing 
commentary that carefully explains the data for the reader. 
1. How Often do Chinese Courts Award SP for Contract Breaches? 
To evaluate this question, we analyzed Question 6 (Q6) (“Taking into 
account all of the contractual breach cases you have presided over, in what 
percentage would you say SP was awarded?”) with the responses divided into 
‘0 - 10%’ and ‘> 10%’, then viewed the data with respect to Question 2 (Q2) 
(“In what level of court do you currently preside?”). The responses to Q6 
indicate the general frequency with which SP is awarded while concurrently 
illustrating any trends within the different levels of the court system. The 




Dichotomized Q6 Frequencies by Court Where Q6 is Not Missing 
(N=339) 
 
 Court  
Dichotomized 
Q6 Trial Intermediate High Total 
[0, 10] 136 (59.4) 30 (39.4) 17 (35.4) 183 
[10, 100] 93 (40.6) 47 (61) 31 (64.6) 171 
Total 229 77 48 354 
 
Overall, a little over 52% (183 out of 354) of all judges surveyed 
awarded SP in less than 10% of claims. In examining Table 1, it becomes 
clear that Trial Court judges rarely award SP when presiding over a claim of 
contractual breach. At the Trial Court level, 59.4% of judges awarded SP in 
less than 10% of their decisions. In the Intermediate and High Courts, the 
number of judges who awarded SP in less than 10% of claims or less was 
39.04% and 35.4%, respectively. After adjustment for Q1 (“What is the 
length of your tenure as a judge?”) in a logistic regression of Q6, the 
proportion of judges awarding SP in less than 10% of cases decreased in 
Intermediate and High Courts relative to Trial Courts [Intermediate vs. Trial 
OR=0.374 95% CI (0.1919, 0.7084) p=-0.0042. High vs Trial OR=0.431 
95% CI (0.251, 0.7383) p=0.0021]. More telling is that overall across every 
level of the court system nearly 59% of judges had never awarded SP. We 
adjusted for Q1 to address the possibility of a skewered finding based upon 
the length of service (amount of judicial experience). 
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The data clearly indicates that the percentage of cases awarding SP 
varies with the level of the court. In Trial Courts, SP is frugally awarded, 
while there is a slight increase in SP awards at both the Intermediate and High 
Court levels.117 One possible explanation could be that the Trial Courts are 
under greater time pressure than the Intermediate and High Courts and, 
therefore, incentivized to expeditiously conclude civil suits, which is best 
achieved by awarding damages or other forms of monetary compensation 
instead of SP. SP will inevitably involve the greater use of the court’s time 
in supervising the enforcement of the performance. 
There is also pressure on the Intermediate and High Courts under the 
ordinary procedure, which requires judges to complete cases within six 
months from the time the cases are filed. However, the amounts in dispute 
for contract breach are much higher at the Intermediate and High Court 
levels.118 In other words, the stakes on average (harm alleged per case) are 
smaller at the lower Trial Court level.119 If the judges are under time pressure 
to deal with a larger number of small cases, more likely than not they will try 
to quickly settle the disputes either through monetary awards or court-
annexed mediation. On the other hand, the appellate courts hear fewer cases 
involving large amounts of money and are more likely to take the time to 
consider SP as an alternative remedy. 
Another explanation for the higher rate of issuance of SP in the appellate 
courts is the greater level of expertise associated with judges on the higher 
courts. It may be that the higher quality of appellate judges allows them to 
partake in a deeper analysis that leads to decisions in favor of SP in cases 
where the giving of damages is determined to be inadequate. The deeper 
analysis likely uncovers findings that the harm caused is greater than the 
damages that can be awarded. This would be an unlikely outcome under a 
more superficial analysis. With these findings, we move to our Taxonomy 
Persuasion Hypothesis120 to investigate whether Chinese judges’ preference 
for damages affects the preliminary stages of a claim and their predisposition 
                                                          
 117 This pressure is partially due to the prevalence of summary proceedings. According to 
a national survey conducted by the Supreme People’s Court, 80% of civil litigation before the 
Trial Courts apply the summary procedure, which means cases must be closed within 3 months 
from the date they were officially filed. See more details at the Several Opinions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Further Promoting the Simplification of Cases, Streamlining and 
Optimizing the Distribution of Judicial Resources issued by SPC in 2016《最高人民法院关
于进一步推进案件繁简分流优化司法资源配置的若干意见》, available at the official 
website of the Supreme People’s Court: http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-
26061.html. 
 118 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Adjusting the Standards for Jurisdiction of 
Civil and Commercial Cases of the First Instance by the High and Intermediate People’s Court, 
Fa Fa No. 7 (2015), available at the official website of the Supreme People’s Court: 
http://www.court.gov.cn/shenpan-xiangqing-14366.html. 
 119 Id. 
 120 This hypothesis relates to contract types; simply put, breaches of certain types or 
categories of contracts are more or less likely to be the beneficiary of SP orders. 
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against granting SP. In sum, what factors or rationales explain the low rate 
of the issuance of orders of SP? 
2. Predictive Factors and Party Preference 
What are the controlling or predictive factors that influence judges’ 
decisions to award SP? Do courts respect the parties’ ex ante specification in 
their contract as to preferred remedy (such as a specific performance clause)? 
These questions are tested based upon responses to Q8 and Q7. First, does 
the type of contract involved in the dispute predict the likelihood of the 
issuance of an order of SP? Second, is there a substantial amount of cases 
where judges attempt to dissuade a claimant against a request for SP in favor 
of a damages award? If so, what variables predict the disposition of the court 
in favor of an award of damages? In analyzing these questions, the first 
objective was to examine Q8 (“In your experience, do you find a need to 
address a taxonomy of contracts when you decide whether to consider a SP 
order?”). Are courts more willing to give SP for certain types of contracts 
across each level of the court system? The more difficult question to verify 
is whether judges take an active role in steering claimants to a preferred 
remedy? The view of judges as passive or proactive players in determining 
the claimant’s choice of remedy is posed by (Q7) (“Have you ever considered 
persuading a party to change a claim for SP to a claim for damages?”). The 
analysis attempts to find variables (addressed in other questions) that predict 
a judge’s active intervention in the choice of remedy, such as years of 
practice, the number of cases the judge presided over relating to breach of 
contract, independent consideration of SP, the opinion of colleagues, the 
percentage of contractual breach cases in which SP was awarded, the 
taxonomy of contracts, the costs of supervision, and so forth. Regarding the 
influence of contract type on SP, an unpublished report released by the 
Beijing Mentougou trial court delineated the number of SP orders based on 
contract categories (see Figure 3).121 
  
                                                          
 121 ‘Report of Issues Concerning Continued Performance of Contracts’ is an unpublished 
report under the auspice of Supreme People’s Court Research Project in 2013. 







































The above figure shows that certain categories of contract disputes are 
far more likely to obtain an order of SP. The findings are interesting in a 
number of ways. First, the overall percentage of cases across categories of 
contracts that granted SP was much lower than expected in a legal system 
that does not prioritize remedies of SP and damages. It is no surprise that the 
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real estate. This would also be the case under common law where real estate 
is considered a unique subject matter that warrants the remedy of SP. The 
importance of compelling performance in cases involving real estate is 
amplified given that the great majority of contract categories relate to real 
property (construction, housing, leasing, lending). Nonetheless, the 
percentage of SP awards is very low. 
Another surprising finding is that the second highest percentage of SP 
orders relate to the sale of goods (10.18%). This certainly would not be the 
case under the common law, where damages are the most commonly given 
remedy; only in the rarest cases of unique goods would a common law judge 
entertain SP.122 Although high from the perspective of the common law, this 
rate is low vis-à-vis damage awards, which is not what one would expect to 
see in a remedial scheme where both types of remedies are considered 
ordinary (choice of claimant). Logically, there are two factors behind the low 
percentage: non-breaching parties choose damages as their preferred remedy 
and judges disfavor SP as a remedy of choice. The first factor can be 
explained as a reasonable outcome in relatively efficient markets for fungible 
goods and the higher transaction costs related to compelling performance. 
Therefore, the claim for damages is the more efficient and rational decision. 
Another explanation is that due to the structure of Chinese society and the 
importance of non-legal norms based on Confucian and socialistic-
communitarian values, reputational effects play a large role in the regulation 
of breach of contract.123 To breach a contract dishonors the non-breaching 
party who then would no longer want to have further contact with the 
breaching party. Payment of damages, along with creation of negative 
reputational effects, would be viewed as just punishment from the 
perspective of the aggrieved party. The second factor, judicial intervention, 
will be discussed below. 
The ancillary question to the percentage of SP orders in various types 
of contract disputes is whether the overall low level of use of SP as a remedy 
is statistically associated with a number of variables including the category 
of contract, the likelihood of SP being considered, and whether a judge, upon 
addressing a taxonomy of contracts at the preliminary stages, actively 
persuades a party to change its claim from SP to damages. 
The rationale for including Q8 in the questionnaire was to determine 
                                                          
 122 U.C.C. § 2-716(1) provides that: “[s]pecific performance may be decreed where the 
goods are unique . . .”; it also provides that even when the goods are not considered to be 
unique SP may still be possible in cases where “[t]he buyer has a right of replevin for goods 
identified to the contract if after reasonable effort the buyer is unable to effect cover for such 
goods.” See U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
 123 See Larry A. DiMatteo, ‘Rule of Law’ in China: The Confrontation of Formal Law with 
Cultural Norms, 51 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 392, 417 (2018) (“China has a long history of non-
formal customary law that still plays a role in business practice as well as how contracts are 
viewed as a private ordering instrument. Confucian norms also deter resorting to the court 
system as a method of resolving contract disputes.”). 
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whether judges were more likely to consider the merits of awarding SP based 
on the general taxonomy of contracts.124 If a judge willingly and actively 
addresses the taxonomy of contracts, then certain types of contracts (such as 
partnership agreements) would be considered incompatible with SP. This is 
notable as it suggests that judges may form an opinion about the available 
remedies appropriate for a claim before the beginning of the proceedings. 
This is especially important in civil law countries where SP is supposedly an 
ordinary remedy that should be applied irrespective of contract type. 
Thus, in the context of transaction types, it is likely that a judge would 
consider persuading a claimant to change a claim for SP to a claim of 
damages for some types of contracts during the preliminary phases of the 
litigation (pre-trial) (Q7). Therefore, the survey explores statistical 
associations between responses and factors indicative of a proactive 
preliminary judicial posture, as well as ferreting out judges’ general attitude 
toward SP. Figure 4 shows the percentage of positive responses to the 
question of whether a judge feels the need to address a taxonomy of contracts 
when deciding whether to consider a SP order.   
 
Figure 4 
Responses to Q8 by Levels of Court  
(felt need to consider taxonomy of contracts) 
 
 
Figure 4 demonstrates the distribution of responses to Q8 across each 
                                                          
 124 See supra Figure 2. 
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level of courts. About half of the Trial and High Courts (50% and 52.9%) felt 
it necessary to consult an accepted taxonomy of contracts when evaluating a 
claim for SP. Notably, 64% of the Intermediate Courts’ judges considered 
the type of contract as an important factor in deciding on SP. Again, the 
higher percentage of appellate court judges engaging taxonomy of contracts 
models is explainable by the quality of such judges, who are more 
sophisticated and experienced in understanding the variations between 
categories of contracts and the corresponding contractual disputes, as 
compared to the judges at the Trial Court level.125 
There are numerous institutional factors that partially account for the 
lower percentage of Trial Court judges relying on the taxonomy of contracts 
in issuances of SP. The major institutional factor is the procedural emphasis 
placed on negotiation and mediation at the Trial Court level.126 It is in this 
area that judges may persuade the disputing parties to agree to a damage 
settlement. Verdict (Pan Jue) and ruling (Cai Ding) are two standard forms 
of judicial decisions in China. Verdict is the default way of making a 
decision, a consequence of adjudication. A ruling is based on the consent of 
the litigants, in which they agree to waive their rights to appeal.127 A ruling 
is a consequence of judicial mediation and negotiation. If the litigants agree 
to a ruling, their litigation fees are cut in half.128 In practice, many judges 
prefer offering rulings than rendering verdicts.129 This is because by giving a 
ruling they avoid the risks of retrial, which increases their workload and 
possibly causes them to suffer lower performance ratings if their verdicts are 
found in error by higher courts. 
An interview with Judge W, a quota judge from High Court H, was 
especially revealing.130 Judge W has been presiding over contractual disputes 
for more than eight years. Regarding contract types and SP he stated: 
“…while High Court judges also hope to settle a case via mediation, I am 
mindful of the different judicial attitude[s] that different types of contracts 
tend to receive before I consider awarding SP in a given case.” The practice 
                                                          
 125 With the introduction of the Quota Judge System by the SPC, only a person who is 
qualified as a judge is allowed to hear the case. The higher courts have a higher standard than 
lower courts in selecting quota judges. For example, the Guangdong High People’s Court did 
not recruit any quota judges who were born after 1981 in 2017. But many Intermediate and 
Trial Courts in Guangdong province have recruited quota judges who were born after 1980 
with less trial experience. Yulin Fu, Court management in transformation China: A 
Perspective of Civil Justice, 6 PEKING U. L. J. 82, 83-84 (2018). 
 126 Kwai Hang Ng & Xin He, Internal Contradictions of Judicial Mediation in China, 39 
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 285, 290 (2014). 
 127 Chapter VIII of the PRC Civil Procedure Law. 
 128 诉讼费用交纳办法 [现行有效] [Measures on the Payment of Litigation Costs] 
(promulgated by St. Council of People’s Republic of China, Dec. 19, 2006, effective Apr. 1, 
2007) at art. 15. 
 129 Chen, supra note 95, at 114. 
 130 Interview with Judge W, Quota Judge, High Court H, at her Court office (Dec. 16, 
2018). 
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of forcing judicial mediation is also found at the High Court level. Judge W 
noted that there “are institutional incentives that apply to High Court judges 
and encourage us to be proponents of judicial mediation. We also want to 
play safe. By that I mean, to close a case via judicial mediation will not only 
be taken into account during our performance assessment, but it also makes 
the litigants happy.” However, Judge W stressed that the importance of 
adjudication over mediation is stronger at the High Court level: 
Generally, the cases that make their way to the High Courts have 
much at stake. They are extremely costly to both sides, and many of 
them are appeal cases; such a confluence of circumstances does not 
always lend itself to mediation. We will often try to mediate but we 
are concurrently well prepared to adjudicate by delivering a verdict. 
Judge W’s commentary and Figure 4 illustrate that High Court judges 
are more sensitive to the taxonomy of contracts than judges at lower levels 
of courts in China. The practice of court-mandated mediation is especially 
strong in the lower courts.131 Thus, if judges prefer to use mediation often to 
settle a variety of contract disputes, then it is understandable that they are less 
likely to pay heed to the taxonomy of contracts when delivering remedies. 
By contrast, judges at the High Courts are more likely than not to adjudicate, 
which makes them more sensitive to contract type and more open to SP for 
certain types of contracts. It should also be noted that the need or judicial 
preference for mediation is less plausible at the appellate court levels, since 
it is likely that the parties have already been through multiple rounds of 
mediation at the lower court level and had failed to agree to a resolution.132 
As noted above, since it is a costly and lengthy process to reach the High 
Court level, the disputants have high expectations of obtaining a judicial 
resolution (verdict). These factors explain why High Court judges appear to 
appreciate and use the taxonomy of contracts analysis more than judges in 
the lower courts. 
  
                                                          
 131 Yedan Li, Joris Kocken & Benjamin van Rooij, Understanding China’s Court 
Mediation Surge: Insights from a Local Court, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 58, 59-60 (2018). 
 132 PETER C.H. CHAN, MEDIATION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CIVIL JUSTICE: A 
PROCEDURALIST DIACHRONIC 210-12 (2017). 
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Figure 5  
Responses to Q7 by Levels of Court 
 
 
Figure 5 above illustrates the relative distribution between the responses 
in Q7 (“Have you ever considered attempting to persuade the claiming party 
to change a claim for SP to a claim for damages?”). Q7 most directly 
addresses the value of SP relative to a claim for damages. The percentage of 
judges responding ‘Yes’ to Q7 (Figure 4) did not vary significantly across 
the court system (p=0.8720). It is posed that if a judge is willing to actively 
persuade a claimant to change its claim for damages to one for SP, then the 
judge, taking into account various factors and benefitting from prior judicial 
experience, has come to recognize that SP is not suitable or feasible in some 
types of cases. Notably, over 55% of the surveyed judges in the Intermediate 
Courts and roughly 52% of judges in the High Courts consider persuading 
claimants to change their claim to damages. However, only about 40% of the 
judges in the Trial Courts would consider it appropriate to try and dissuade a 
claimant to pursue SP. 
As with the use of a taxonomy of contracts analysis, it seems the lower 
rate of judicial influence in the choice of remedy in the lower courts is in part 
due to their lack of experience, along with the time constraints related to 
heavy caseloads (leaving judges with little time or interest in persuading a 
party to change its chosen remedy). For those cases that appear unworthy of 
or inappropriate for awarding SP, experienced judges attempt to persuade 
claimants to change their remedial requests prior to the beginning of an 
official court hearing. It is in the best interests of all parties, including the 
court, to counsel the claimant to seek damages when the likelihood of being 
granted an order of SP is slight. This is especially true when a claimant seeks 
Specific Performance in Chinese Courts 
40:275 (2020) 
311 
the sole remedy of SP in its summons.133 
Figure 6 below shows that Trial Court judges’ responses to Question 8 
(Q8) (“In your experience, do you find a need to address a taxonomy of 
contracts when you decide whether to consider a SP order?”) were 
significantly correlated to positive responses to Q7. The percentage of Trial 
Court judges selecting ‘Yes’ in response to Q8 and Q7 was 64.9%.134 
 
Figure 6 
Trial Courts Cross Tabulation by Response to Question 7 with 
Reference to Question 8 
 
 Trial Courts:  Question 7  
Question Text No (N=140) Yes (N=94) Total P=value 
Q8 Need to address taxonomy? n (%)    <0.001 
 No 84 (60) 33 (35.1) 117 (50)  
 Yes 56 (40) 61 (64.9) 117 (50)  
 Total 140 94 234  
 
These findings indicate that where a Trial Court judge felt it was 
important to pursue a taxonomy of contracts analysis in considering whether 
to decree an order of SP, she was also more likely to consider persuading a 
party to change a claim for SP to a claim for damages. 
  
                                                          
 133 In Chinese civil procedure law, a summons is similar to a statement of claim or 
complaint in the common law. 
 134 64.9 % of those judges who answered ‘yes’ to Q7 also responded ‘yes’ to Q8. 40 per 
cent of the judges who answered ‘no’ to Q7 responded ‘yes’ to Q8. 
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Figure 7 
Intermediate Court Cross Tabulation by Response to Question 7 with 




Question 7  
Question Text No (N=25) Yes (N=27) Total P=value 
Q8 Need to address a taxonomy? n (%)    0.002 
 No 17 (70.8) 7 (25.9) 24 (47.1)  
 Yes 7 (29.2) 20 (74.1) 27 (52.9)  
 Total 24 27 51  
 
Figure 7 above shows that in the Intermediate Courts, the responses to 
Q8 were significantly associated with the responses to Q7. The percentage of 
Intermediate Court judges selecting ‘Yes’ in response to Q8 and Q7 was 
74.1%. 
As with the Trial Courts, these findings indicate that where an 
Intermediate Court judge felt it was important to address the taxonomy of 
contracts in considering whether to decree an order of SP, the judge was more 
likely to consider persuading a party to change its claim for SP to a claim for 
damages. 
Figure 8 below shows that the percentage of High Court judges selecting 
‘Yes’ in response to Q8 did not vary significantly with the response to Q7. 
However, while 71.7% of High Court judges who answered ‘Yes’ to Q8 also 
answered ‘Yes’ to Q7, the findings failed to reach statistical significance 
(p=0.11).135 
  
                                                          
 135 This is most likely due to our modest sample size and the rather even distribution of 
responses to Q8 by judges who answered ‘No’ to Q7. 




High Court Cross Tabulation by response to Question 7 with  






Question Text No (N=38) Yes (N=47) Total P=value 
8 Need to address a taxonomy? n (%)    0.11 
 No 17 (45.9) 13 (28.3) 30 (36.1)  
 Yes 20 (54.1) 33 (71.7) 53 (63.9)  
 Total 37 46 83  
 
 
Despite the lack of statistical significance, it is important to note that the 
High Court judges were more likely than not to try to persuade a claimant to 
change its claim from SP to damages. Further, regardless of their response to 
Q7, the High Court judges were substantially more partial to consulting the 
taxonomy of contracts when considering an award of specific performance. 
3. Availability of Specific Performance 
If SP is seldom awarded, what are the underlying reasons or rationales 
for its frugal use? Under what circumstances is the remedy of SP likely to be 
granted and under what circumstances will its use be restricted? In exploring 
these questions, the concern over high transaction costs as a factor was 
explored by Question 9 (Q9) (“Do the supervision costs of enforcement 
factor heavily in making your decision on remedies?”). Secondly, the survey 
examined the association between Q2 (level of court) and Q9 in order to 
assess whether the concern for supervision costs varied between the levels of 
the court system. Next, the association between Q7 and Q9 was examined. 
Comparing the responses from Q7 to those in Q9 allows for a determination 
of whether supervision costs were a significant factor for judges who were 
strongly for or against awarding SP. 
Figure 9 below reveals the distribution of responses regarding Q9 across 
the levels of the court system. The results did not support the hypothesis that 
supervision or enforcement costs are a prominent factor in judges’ decisions 
to award SP as we surmised. But it is still a relevant factor because overall, 
51.7% of surveyed judges viewed supervision costs as prohibitive in forming 
their decision to award SP. Perhaps more surprisingly, almost 43.1% of High 
Court judges responded that they did not feel that supervision costs were a 
factor in their decisions on whether to award SP. At the Trial Court level, 
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only 52.3% of judges felt that supervision costs were an important factor, 
while 59.8% of judges in the Intermediate Courts viewed supervision costs 
as a major concern. However, it should be noted that the Intermediate Courts 
make up n=85 (22.8%) of the total sample size (n=373), and as a result, 
should be viewed with some reservation. 
 
Figure 9 
Responses to Q9 by Levels of Court 
 
These results are surprising because of the view that the costs in time 
and money of supervising the implementation of a SP order was thought to 
be by far the strongest rationale for awarding damages instead of SP. This 
was not the case. If the enforcement process is difficult and unduly lengthy, 
there is a high probability that a court would decline to issue a SP order. 
Some insights can be gleaned from an interview conducted with Judge Z, a 
Trial Court judge.136 Judge Z graduated from one of the most prestigious law 
schools in China and has been working in the Civil Tribunal of his court since 
2012. Below are excerpts from the interview: 
Q: Do you consider the supervision costs of enforcement as one of the 
reasons affecting your decision to award SP? 
A: No… sometimes… but, no. 
                                                          
 136 Interview with Judge Z, Trial Court Judge, at his Court office (Dec. 12, 2018). 
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Q: You seem unsure of this. Are you certain the answer is “no”? 
A: As a Trial Court judge, we are often overwhelmed by the volume 
of our caseload. As you have perhaps heard, the Chinese courts are 
often confronted with what we term ‘litigation explosion.’ In theory, 
we need to consider the supervision costs, but in practice, we simply 
cannot afford to consider it because we are under immense pressure 
to conclude the claim and move on to the next one. Under the Chinese 
Civil Procedure Law, we are required to complete the proceedings by 
delivering the judgment within six months of it being docketed. For 
cases applying summary procedures, which amount to the large bulk 
of cases at a trial court, we have to complete the entire claim within 
three months. I, personally, have been assigned 310 cases in the last 
year alone. As you might imagine, the simple math requires that I must 
issue judgments on an almost daily basis. 
Q: So, would [you] say that the heavy caseload bars you from 
considering supervision costs as a factor? 
A: Certainly. More than that, if you look at the variety, volume and 
nature of the tasks judges confront on a day-to-day basis, including 
administrative and routine activities, such as the mandatory half-day 
political study every week, you will appreciate that Chinese judges’ 
work environment and Chinese court’s social function are very 
different from other jurisdictions [countries]. 
Q: I understand. But what if your SP order requires particularly high 
supervision costs in order for it to be enforced? Put differently, will 
your performance appraisal be affected if your SP order has proven 
very difficult to enforce? 
A: No. 
Q: Why? 
A: First, it comes down to the internal organizational structure of the 
court and compartmentalization. The trial units handle the hearings 
and deliver judgments. There is an entirely different unit that is 
responsible for the supervision and enforcement of judgments. 
Therefore, at the trial unit, we do not concern ourselves with the way 
in which a difficult judgment is enforced. The only exception to this 
is when a case involves an administrative petition (XINFANG).137 
Second, as a trial judge, my concerns stem from the possibility of one 
of my judicial decisions being reversed rather than any potential 
supervision or enforcement issues. Therefore, as you can likely 
appreciate, the supervision and enforcement is not officially part of 
                                                          
 137 Xinfang or Administrative Petitioning (also known as letters and visits) is the 
administrative system for hearing complaints and grievances from individuals in the PRC. 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 40:275 (2020) 
316 
my duties or performance appraisal scheme.138 So why should I let it 
factor into what I view is a prudent remedy? 
To reinforce the discourse above, Judge Z’s explanation of indifference 
to awarding damages or SP relates mostly to the structural division of work 
assignments in the Chinese courts139 and current judicial reform policies.140 
Thus, concerns about additional transaction costs of SP are not captured as a 
factor in decision-making at the Trial Court level because the adjudicating 
divisions are separate from the judgment enforcement division. More 
tellingly, adjudicating judges are far more concerned about the potential of 
their decisions being overturned by the appellate courts than whether the 
decisions prove difficult to enforce. Nevertheless, the problem of judgments 
being issued by the lower Chinese courts proving difficult to enforce has 
begun to attract attention. There are now several campaigns underway aimed 
at minimizing the difficulties of enforcement. The SPC has established a 
special website on “resolving judgment enforcement problems.”141 
4. Probability of Obtaining Specific Performance as an Anchor in 
Settlement Negotiations 
Will defendants be more amenable to agreeing to pay damages where it 
appears the claimant has a plausible likelihood of obtaining SP? The last 
analysis examines the willingness of defendants to settle for damages to 
avoid being compelled to perform part of a contract. Question 11 (“In your 
experience, when a SP order is requested by the claimant, how often [do] 
you find that the defendant would like to settle the case before you decree a 
SP order? Please indicate a percentage from 0-100%”) tests the propensity 
                                                          
 138 Chinese courts have developed a performance appraisal system to measure judges’ 
performance. According to the Chinese Judges Law, the court will reward and punish judges 
based on the appraisal results. “The Guiding Opinion on Carrying out the Case Quality 
Evaluation Work” issued by SPC in 2008 and revised in 2011, stipulates how the SPC assesses 
the performance of courts at all levels nationwide. The appraisal system consists of 31 
performance indicators, which are divided into three categories: trial fairness, trial efficiency, 
and trial effect. See Guodong Du & Meng Yu, Performance Appraisal: A Decisive Factor in 
Chinese Judges’ Behavior Patterns, CHINA JUSTICE OBSERVER (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://www.chinajusticeobserver.com/insights/performance-appraisal-a-decisive-factor-in-
chinese-judges-behavior-patterns.html. 
 139 Within the Chinese Courts at all levels, a judgment enforcement department (JED) is 
responsible for organizing and handling enforcement work. JED is not an independent 
governmental agency but an internal department in the Court. However, JED is a separate 
internal unit from the trail units within a court. JEDs of Chinese courts at the primary and 
intermediate levels undertake most enforcement work. 
 140 The Third-round Judicial Reform during 2014-2017 initiated by SPC introduced a 
judicial accountability system, which means that “he who has tried the case shall decide the 
case, and he who makes the judgment shall be held accountable”; see also SPC REPORT, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-66802.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2020). 
 141 See SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://jszx.court.
gov.cn/main/ExecuteDynamic.jhtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2020). 
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of defendants to pay damages in cases were the rationales for SP are strong. 
The responses answered as a percentage have been categorized into quartiles. 
The responses are also presented according to the level of the court system. 
The point of interest was whether defendants’ willingness to settle in cases 
where there was a strong probability of the issuance of a SP order changed 
depending on the level of the court system. The results of the likelihood of 
settlement in cases where SP is requested are summarized in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 
Q11: SP and Settlement by Level of Court142 
 
The distribution shows that overall, the three levels of courts’ mean 
values for Q11 (Intermediate 31.5%, Trial 32.6%, High 31.6%) were not 
significantly different (p=0.96) and none of the pairwise contrasts were 
significant. Essentially, what this illustrates is that there were no significant 
differences between the defendants’ propensity to settle across the levels of 
the court system. One might have expected to see defendants more motivated 
to settle by paying damages at the Trial Court level. However, defendants 
were as unlikely to settle in the trial courts as they were in the intermediate 
or high courts. 
The correlation between the claimants’ request for SP and defendants’ 
willingness to pay damages was not as strong as expected. The rate of the 
judges’ belief that defendants were more open to settlement when a SP order 
was requested ranged from 31.5% to 32.6% as noted above. Once again, this 
                                                          
 142 Boxes are determined by the first and third quartiles and whiskers extend to the 
maximum, minimum, and a horizontal line at the midpoint of each box indicates the median. 
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low percentage is likely due to the perception of whether the request for SP 
was perceived as having a high likelihood of success. For example, the 
correlation between a request for SP and settlement would likely be more 
statistically significant in cases involving real estate because of the higher 
rate of SP in those types of cases. 
The empirical survey shows that although Chinese contract law 
replicates civil law’s indifference between the remedies of damages and SP, 
in practice the law resembles a hybrid between the civil law’s indifference 
and the common law’s view that SP is the remedy of last resort. This is seen 
in the Chinese courts’ creation of a number of rules of thumb or heuristics143 
restricting the availability of SP in certain cases. First, in cases where it is 
reasonable for the non-breaching party to obtain substituted goods, a 
claimant’s request for SP is considered to be unreasonable.144 Because of the 
higher transaction costs of SP, cover145 or purchase of substituted goods may 
be considered within the non-breaching party’s duty to mitigate damages. 
Furthermore, the failure to mitigate damages is viewed as an act of bad 
faith146 or commercial unreasonableness that precludes the granting of SP.147 
Failure to mitigate or bad faith acts are especially likely to be recognized in 
cases where the breaching party’s costs of performing are considerably 
higher than the non-breaching party’s costs of purchasing substituted goods. 
Second, courts often weigh whether the enforcement of an order of SP would 
be “difficult and unduly lengthy.”148 Again, if it were more cost effective for 
the non-breaching party to purchase substituted goods and recover damages 
then the compelling of performance through SP would be considered 
unreasonable. 
V. BUILDING A DESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
REMEDIES 
The empirical survey shows that in practice, there is limited use of SP 
as a remedy compared to the widespread use of damages. The purpose of the 
                                                          
 143 Availability of Specific Remedies, supra note 20, at 31-33. 
 144 Id. at 32 (“[I]t has been generally acknowledged among the Chinese academic 
community and in the courts that [SP] cannot be claimed if a substitute transaction can be 
reasonably obtained.”), cited in Sun Liangguo, The Realization of Expectation Interest: A 
Study of Substitute Transaction, 6 CONTEMP. L. REV. (2009)); see also HAN, supra note 4, at 
612. 
 145 The right to cover is a common legal term for the buyer buying substitute goods after 
breach of contract. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-712(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) 
(“After a breach . . . the buyer may ‘cover’ by making in good faith and without unreasonable 
delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due 
from the seller.”). 
 146 The duty of good faith in Chinese contract law as applied by the Chinese courts plays 
an outsized role in judicial interpretation of contracts and application of contract rules. See 
DiMatteo, supra note 124, at 428-40. 
 147 Availability of Specific Remedies,  supra note 20, at 32. 
 148 Id. at 37. 
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empirical survey was to determine if SP was indeed treated as an ordinary 
remedy and, if not, why. The empirical findings presented here support the 
claim that SP under Chinese law, despite the clarity of its formal law, is 
viewed as an unattractive and less commonly used remedy than is assumed. 
This part and the next offer two theories—one descriptive and the other 
normative—to account for the frugal use of SP in Chinese law. 
As noted earlier, contract remedies are divided into two types: damages 
and non-monetary. The non-monetary remedies include SP, injunctions, 
termination of contracts (common law rescission), and adjustment of 
contracts (common law reformation).149 A major divergence between civil 
and common law is their treatment of the SP remedy. The civil law does not 
formally prioritize damage and non-damage remedies, while the common 
law gives priority to the awarding of damages over the remedy of SP. A 
number of rationales have been offered to justify the equality of SP and 
damages in civil law remedies: (1) the availability of specific performance is 
justified from a moral point of view (people ought to keep their promises); 
(2) specific performance is a right, rather than a remedy, therefore parties to 
a contract are entitled to request specific performance; (3) damages are 
under-compensatory, for example, some losses that are not compensated for 
include emotional distress, loss of time, speculative damages, and in some 
cases the recovery of legal costs; and (4) the availability of specific 
performance enhances efficiency (honoring the non-breaching party the 
preference as to remedy).150 
Because of the history of the two-court system in common law 
jurisdictions, contractual remedies were bifurcated. The English or royal 
courts, and then later the law courts, were only able to issue awards of 
damages. The ecclesiastical or church courts, and later the courts of equity or 
chancery,151 were only able to award non-monetary remedies, such as SP. 
However, the two court systems eventually merged.152 Today, law courts can 
                                                          
 149 Injunctions are more prevalent in areas such as tort law, such in cases of trespass or 
nuisance, and in the infringement of intellectual property rights. Reformation and rescission 
are found in both the civil and common laws. The major difference in their use is the civil 
law’s concern for contractual equilibrium. In German law, if the contract becomes out of 
balance (parties’ valuations of costs and benefits at the time of contract formation) subsequent 
to the conclusion of the contract due to some unexpected event, which causes a hardship on 
one of the parties, then the parties are under a duty to renegotiate to place the contract back 
into equilibrium. The common law has no such principle. Thus, judicial termination or 
adjustment of the contract is more common in the civil law. 
 150 Chen, supra note 96, at 100; Herman, supra note 7, at 212-13 (“If we look back over 
centuries of judicial decisions ordering specific performance, the claim of economic 
inefficiency of specific performance seems a modern gloss . . .”). 
 151 “The most important historical limitation grew out of the circumstance that the 
chancellor [ecclesiastical courts and then court of equity] had originally granted equitable 
relief in order to supply the deficiencies of the common law. . . When during the long 
jurisdictional struggle between the two systems of courts.” Farnsworth supra note 15 at 163-
64. 
 152 The Supreme Judicature Act of 1873 ended the competitive, separate law and equity 
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award any type of remedy. However, the old bifurcation of remedies was 
transplanted into the unitary court system with legal remedies (damages) 
being prioritized as the ordinary remedy and equitable remedies (SP) 
relegated to the non-preferred status of extraordinary remedies. The 
difference between viewing SP in the civil law as an available or primary 
remedy in all cases (claimant’s choice) versus the common law’s view that 
damages should always be awarded unless they prove to be inadequate 
(judicial choice) has been considered one of the major differences between 
the two legal systems.153 Clearly this is the case when comparing formal law, 
but is it the case in practice? Do the two systems converge, that is, reach 
similar outcomes? The empirical survey presented in Part IV takes an initial 
step to answer these questions in the case of Chinese civil law. The findings 
conclude that in the Chinese court system there has been a convergence of 
the civil and common law approaches to SP as a remedy. This part offers a 
descriptive theory that explains this convergence. 
A. Specific Performance is not an Ordinary Remedy After All 
The percentage of court decisions in which a SP order was issued was 
relatively small. Judges at the trial court level were frugal in using SP as a 
remedy, with 59.4% of the judges answering that they used the remedy in 
less than 10% of their cases.154 The rate was higher at the appellate levels 
with 61% of the Intermediate Court and 64.6% of High Court judges issuing 
SP orders above 10% of the time.155 Unfortunately, the survey was simplified 
                                                          
courts in England. In 1873, Parliament passed the Judicature Act, which merged common law 
courts and courts of equity. Although one of the Divisions of the High Court is still called 
Chancery, all courts could now administer both equity and common law with equity to reign 
supreme in any dispute. S.C. of Judicature Act, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 (1873). The merging of 
the courts in the United States began with New York State’s adoption of the “Field Code” in 
1848. The Field Code provided a single law that today we simply recognize as civil procedure 
for all courts, essentially merging the law and equity courts into a single court system in which 
parties could request legal and equitable remedies. Rudiments of the old dual system still 
survey. In the United States, the states of Delaware, Mississippi, New Jersey, South Carolina, 
and Tennessee preserve the distinctions between law and equity and between courts of law 
and courts of equity. See Mildred Coe & Lewis Morse, Chronology of the Development of the 
David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L. REV. 238 (1942) (discussing the adoption of the 
Field Code in New York); see also Kellen Funk, The Influence of the Field Code, WORDPRESS 
(Sept. 1, 2014), http://kellenfunk.org/field-code/the-influence-of-the-field-code-an-
introduction (showing the spread of the Field Code throughout the U.S.). 
 153 Claims to Performance and Their Enforcement, in KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 479 (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998) (“In both German 
and French law . . . a contractor [party to contract] is in principle entitled to demand that his 
contract be performed in specie [SP]. The standpoint of the Common Law is quite different: if 
a contractor does not do as he promised, the innocent party’s only right, in general, is to bring 
a claim for breach of contract . . . and which always leads to monetary compensation or 
damages.”). 
 154 See supra Figure 2. 
 155 Id. 
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to increase the response rate. It did accomplish this goal, but at the cost of 
more granulated findings. Therefore, no mean percentage can be provided 
for all cases granting SP to the total number of cases. However, using the 
responses of the Trial Court judges, which had a larger sample size than the 
other two levels of courts (219 Trial judges to 72 Intermediate judges to 48 
Higher Court judges) some conclusions may still be reached. The fact that 
62% of the judges granted SP in less than 10% of the cases for breach of 
contract, including 9% of judges that had never issued a SP order, strongly 
indicates that it is not a preferred remedy and, in fact, is infrequently granted 
despite the formal law’s treatment of SP as an equal or preferred remedy.156 
The low rate of the use of SP may be due to party or claimant preference for 
the remedy of damages or the lack of availability of SP (judicial choice). The 
limited use of SP is likely due to a combination of these factors. Either way, 
SP is not a popular remedy from the perspectives of claimants and judges. 
B. Taxonomy of Contracts: Not All Contract Breaches are Ordinary 
Supposedly, the courts should turn a blind eye to the type of contract or 
subject matter of the contract under the civil law. The type of transaction, 
whether for the sale of goods or sale of real estate, should have no bearing on 
the judicial decision to order SP. In the common law, this is not the case. The 
starting point is that, in most cases, SP is to be denied and provable damages 
awarded. SP is reserved for cases of contracts involving unique subject 
matters, such as a one-of-a-kind item, like real estate, paintings, or 
antiques.157 This difference in civil and common law reasoning on the proper 
use of the remedy of SP is not clear in Chinese case law. 
Although SP is most prominent in breaches relating to real estate 
contracts, the rate of SP orders issued was only 24.02% in those cases.158 It 
would be expected that a seller’s failure to transfer property would elicit 
many more SP orders. The second most common area where SP orders were 
issued involved sale of goods contracts at the rate of 10.18%.159 On one hand, 
this rate seems to be low for a civil law system, but on the other hand it would 
be considered a high rate in the common law. The modest rate of SP orders 
in Chinese cases involving the sale of goods is likely due to the fungibility 
of goods. If there are readily available secondary markets for the goods being 
sold in the contract, then the buyer is likely to purchase the goods elsewhere 
and then sue for damages, assuming the cover price is above the contract 
price. This approach is simply the most efficient method of obtaining relief 
                                                          
 156 “Where a party fails to perform a non-monetary obligation or if his performance of the 
non-monetary obligation is not in conformity with the agreement, the other party may demand 
performance . . .” CCL, art. 107. 
 157 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360, cmt. b (“Some types of interests are by 
their very nature incapable of being valued in money. Typical examples include heirlooms, 
family treasures and works of art that induce a strong sentimental attachment.”). 
 158 See supra Figure 3. 
 159 Id. 
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and to mitigate damages. SP is more likely to be used in contracts involving 
customized goods or when there is no efficient secondary market to purchase 
substituted goods. More importantly, the low percentage of SP orders in sale 
of goods contracts is likely also due to the courts using taxonomy of contracts 
approach. In cases where substitute goods are easily available, along with the 
high transaction costs of implementing or monitoring a SP order, a court is 
likely to suggest that the claimant withdraw its request for SP in favor of 
damages. If the claimant does not withdraw his demand for SP, the court will 
deny the claim for SP under the rationale that the claimant did not honor his 
duty to mitigate damages, or by reasoning that the demand for SP is 
unreasonable. 
The importance of the influence of the type of transaction to the 
determination of the need or reasonableness of SP was also shown by the 
responses to the direct question of whether the judges overtly use the 
taxonomy of transaction approach. Across the three court levels, over 50% 
of all judges expressly stated that the type of transaction was a consideration 
in their deciding whether to grant of SP.160 The use of a taxonomy of contracts 
by Chinese courts comes close to the common law approach that SP is only 
to be used for certain types of contracts. 
The percentage of SP orders in other types of contracts are exceedingly 
low, ranging from 0.95% for partnership agreement disputes to 2.37% for 
service contract disputes to 7.10% for leasing contract disputes.161 Again, 
these very low rates of SP for these types of contract disputes are likely due 
to multiple factors—claimants’ preference for money damages and courts 
viewing SP as an unreasonable or unfair remedy. In sum, taken as a whole, 
the rates of the use of the remedy of SP are lower than what would be 
expected in a system where the law does not prioritize remedies. It is also 
clear that a major predictor of successfully obtaining a SP order in China is 
the type of transaction that is at the center of the contract dispute.162 
Finally, a substantial percentage of judges responded that they would 
consider issuing a SP order in cases where there is only a claim for 
damages.163 The point of inquiry here, is whether a judge would consider SP 
on her own accord, even though the non-breaching is making a claim for 
damages. Again, this fits the scenario represented by the influence of the 
taxonomy of contracts approach. In cases such as real estate sales, the 
transaction costs of enforcing the SP order are minimal. If the defendant does 
not voluntarily transfer the property, the court could simply order the local 
administrative office to effectuate the transfer. Additionally, damages would 
                                                          
 160 See supra Figure 4. The rates of judges using the taxonomy of contracts approach are 
as follows: 50% for Trial Courts, 52.9% for Intermediate Courts, and 63.9% for High Courts. 
 161 See supra Figure 3. 
 162 Id. 
 163 See supra Figure 5. The rates of judges willing to consider issuing SP in cases in which 
the remedy was not requested were 40.2% for Trial Courts, 51.9% for Intermediate Courts, 
and 55.3% for High Courts. 
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be difficult to calculate given the uniqueness of the subject matter. The 
importance of the type of contract is also supported by the substantial 
correlation between responses to Q7 (judicial choice of SP) and Q8 
(taxonomy of contracts).164 This correlation suggests that judges attempt to 
align the type of contract with the most appropriate remedy. Again, in the 
sale of real estate, a judge may view SP as the most reasonable and efficient 
remedy despite the claimant’s request for damages. 
C. Inefficiency of Specific Performance Remedy 
It is often assumed, especially in the common law world, that SP is an 
inefficient remedy. The awarding of damages is preferred since the court can 
simply make the award within the confines of the court, while the 
enforcement of SP may involve the court in additional monitoring or legal 
proceedings. In short, SP enforcement entails higher transactions costs to the 
courts, especially considering their busy workloads. This was borne out in 
the survey’s findings of law rates of issuance of SP orders. This assumption 
was the basis for Q9: “Do the supervision costs of enforcement factor heavily 
in making your decision on remedies?” The findings falsified the hypothesis 
that higher transaction costs were an important factor in denying requests for 
SP. Surprisingly, only 47.3% of judges across the three levels of the court 
system felt that supervision (transaction) costs were a factor in deciding on 
whether to issue an order of SP. This percentage is lower than the rate 
expected, but the rate is substantial enough to support the thesis that the cost 
of enforcing SP orders is a factor. The findings may be skewed since judges 
may be less willing to admit that their decisions are more based upon 
procedural or cost saving grounds than on substantive grounds. Also, the 
findings support the thesis, explored in Part V, that efficiency is only one 
value that courts take in consideration and it may be outweighed by other 
values such as good faith, fairness, justice, and equity. 
VI. NORMATIVE THEORY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: 
EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS 
This part discusses the norms and rationales used to justify contract law 
and its applications. It begins with the premise that no single norm or theory 
can explain all of contract law. The above survey showed that efficiency 
(lower transaction costs) was a factor, but not the most important factor in 
the decision whether or not to order SP. This part attempts to provide a 
framework to show what other values are often influential in the application 
of contract law, including the use of remedies. The complexity of contract 
law is explainable only through a composite of norms or theories that often 
vary based upon the type of contract165 and the legal system or tradition being 
                                                          
 164 See supra Figures 6, 7 & 8. 
 165 See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contracts: The Fairness Inquiry and the “Law 
of Satisfaction”—A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 445 (1995) (“Professor 
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studied.166 
The first section briefly frames a normative composite theory of 
contract law.167 It poses that the normative composite is necessarily fluid in 
order to explain all of contract law. The various norms or values are weighed 
differently depending on the type of contract, context of the case (facts), and 
the legal system in which the norms are recognized. These influences impact 
the application of formal law. The normative composite impacts the creation 
of contract law (ex ante) and the application of that law to cases (ex post). 
A. Contract Law’s Normative Composite 
Contract law cannot be explained by a unified theory because it services 
a basket of different norms often in conflict with one another.168 Common 
norms associated with contract law include freedom of contract, certainty, 
predictability, efficiency, justice, fairness, and good faith. As a result of the 
complexity and variety of contract types, contract law rules must deal with a 
variety of factual contexts in which certain values will be more predominant 
than others. Different types of contracts are influenced by ancillary norms. 
For example, the rationale behind sales law is the norm of expediency;169 in 
more formalized contracts, such as, negotiable instruments and letters of 
credit, the ancillary norms would be that of security and trust; in agency 
contracts the norm of loyalty plays a large role in the relationship between 
principal and agent; in long-term contracts, such as supply, distribution, and 
joint venture contracts, relational norms dominate over ex ante freedom of 
contract.170 
In both civil and common law, freedom of contract is considered the 
                                                          
Hillman asserts that ‘contract law is a complex set of rules and principles.’ As such, the 
theoretical underpinnings, by necessity, must reflect that complexity. One may argue that the 
complexity of contract law has grown over the years. The sophistication and complexity of 
modem commercial transactions have tested the rudiments of classical contract law.” Id. at 
445-46 (quoting Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REV. 
103, 103 (1988)). The taxonomy of contracts thesis studied in the empirical survey showed 
that the type of contract was predictive of the likelihood of obtaining SP. 
 166 As noted earlier, the civil and common law legal traditions view the remedy of SP and 
its use differently. See supra notes 3, 4, 22-25, 144 & accompanying text. 
 167 DiMatteo, supra note 166, at 451-53. 
 168 Robert Hillman states: “The problem of many theories of contract, however, is that 
attempts to reduce contract to a simple abstraction leave too much unexplained or distort too 
much to fit the theory.” Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. 
L. REV. 103, 122-23 (1988). 
 169 For example, the requirement of prompt notice of non-conformity under CISG Article 
39 or the right of the buyer to reject goods for minor defects under UCC Section 2-601. In the 
area of remedies, the CISG and the UCC provide simple damage calculations based upon the 
differentials between contract price, market price, and the price of substituted goods. 
 170 Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under 
Classical and Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 890 (1980) 
(“In a truly relational approach [to contracts] the reference point is the entire relation as it had 
developed to the time of the change in question.”). 
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dominant norm of contract law. This is, of course, how it must be since 
contracts are private law, reflective of the idiosyncratic preferences and 
values of the contracting parties. The free market system rests upon private 
parties’ freedom to pursue personal self-interests through contracts. 
However, because of the sometimes-high degree of disparity between the 
characteristics of the parties, the superior party will overreach and abuse its 
freedom of contract. The superior party can be defined as the party with 
superior bargaining power, with the advantage of asymmetrical information 
and greater sophistication. The outcome of the pseudo-bargain between the 
stronger and weaker parties will be judged through contract laws policing 
doctrines,171 as well as tailored laws to protect a class of weaker parties, such 
as consumers and minors.172 Thus, contract law has always, to various 
extents, served two functions—the primary function of the facilitation of 
private ordering and the secondary regulatory function of policing injustices 
within that private ordering.173 SP can be seen as a means of providing justice 
to a weaker party. 
Based upon the findings of the empirical survey presented in Part IV, a 
theory of SP will be offered based upon the norms of efficiency174 and 
fairness.175 The area of contractual remedies necessarily reflects this 
normative composite. More importantly, the application of remedies is 
influenced by the interrelationship between the basket of norms and the facts 
of the case. It is these two norms that represent the core rationales of contract 
law—in the creation of its rules and principles, and in their applications to 
different factual scenarios. They often sit in counterpoise to one another in 
which one must give way to the other in a given case. These core norms also 
are representative of other similar norms. Efficiency is related to the 
                                                          
 171 Policing doctrines include good faith, unconscionability, duress, misrepresentation, and 
mistake. 
 172 Consumer-specific rules are found in consumer protection laws and in the American 
UCC’s special rules in the battle of the forms scenario. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (AM. LAW INST. 
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for 
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless . . 
.”) and U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) for collection of 
consequential damages (“Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the 
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the 
loss is commercial is not.”). Minors are offered special protection in the common law’s 
infancy law doctrine, which allows persons under the age of eighteen to void their contracts. 
 173 Contract law’s regulatory function is found in its policing doctrines: coercion (threat), 
misrepresentation, undue influence, and mistake. See Alan Schwartz, Contract Theory and 
Theories of Contract Régulation, 92 REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE 101, 109 (2000) 
(“Courts can and should enforce the verifiable terms of contracts, police the contracting 
process to deter fraud and duress, and help to supply firms with a common vocabulary to use 
when making contracts.”). 
 174 The efficiency norm is the core theme in the economic analysis of law. 
 175 See James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1592-1603 (1981) 
(highlighting that procedural norms of fairness began to supplant substantive ones as early as 
the eighteenth century). 
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rationales of freedom of contract (private autonomy), as well as certainty and 
predictability of law. Fairness is representative of justice (procedural, 
corrective, and distributive), good faith, and equity. The rebalancing of 
contractual norms can be seen at work in the taxonomy of contracts studied 
in the survey. Different contract types have various normative bases that 
influence the court decisions whether or not to grant SP. 
The power of the often-conflicting norms of efficiency and fairness vary 
across legal systems. English common law, at least in formal law, prizes the 
norms of efficiency, especially the importance of the certainty and 
predictability of law. It weighs in favor of the formal interpretation of 
contracts through plain language meanings. It rejects the duty of good faith 
believing that it would bring too much uncertainty to contracts and make law 
less predictable. Even though English courts may use the term 
unconscionable in their judicial decisions, the English common law rejects 
the policing doctrine or principle of unconscionability.176 The United States 
also places heightened value on freedom of contract and the strict 
enforcement of contractual terms. It rightly or wrongly rejects standard terms 
regulations and freely accepts incorporation by reference of standard terms 
even in consumer contracts.177 However, United States common law 
recognizes the duty of good faith, doctrine of unconscionability, contextual 
interpretation of contracts, and the civil law principle of hardship178 (doctrine 
                                                          
 176 Lord Halsbury in the 1905 case of Clydebank set that threshold as a stipulated amount 
in a liquidated damage clause is determined to be “unconscionable and extravagant, and one 
which no Court ought to allow to be enforced.” Clydebank Eng’g & Ship Bldg. Co. v. 
Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1905] AC 6 (HL). More recently, the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
used the concept of “unconscionable and extravagant.” Cavendish-ParkingEye [2015] UKSC 
67 [19]–[35]. 
 177 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(1) (1981) (stating that a party has 
duty to read the standard terms of a contract; whether the party reads them or understands 
them is immaterial. They are enforceable if the party enters into the contract. “[W]here a party 
to an agreement signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that 
like writings are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts 
the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing.”). 
Comment c succinctly states that “standard terms imposed by one party are enforced.” 
Incorporation by reference is a common method of including terms or other materials found 
in other documents into a contract by simply referencing those terms or documents. Id. at 
§211(1) cmt. c. A standard definition of the principle of incorporation by references is “a 
doctrine in law: the terms of a contemporaneous or earlier writing, instrument, or document 
capable of being identified can be made an actual part of another writing, instrument, or 
document by referring to, identifying, and adopting the former as part of the latter”. MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/incorporation%20by 
%20reference. 
 178 See, e.g., German Civil Code or Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 313. Larry A. 
DiMatteo, Contractual Excuse Under the CISG: Impediment, Hardship, and the Excuse 
Doctrines, 27 PACE INT’L L. REV. 259, 262-63 (2015), citing Dietrich Maskow, Hardship and 
Force Majeure, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 657 (1992) (explaining the difference between force 
majeure or impossibility and hardship) (“The longstanding German law doctrine of Störung 
der Geschäftsgrundlage (interference with the foundation of the contract), codified in Section 




Although on the surface American contract law seems to be a more 
balanced reflection of efficiency and fairness than English common law, in 
fact, the divergence between the two is more a matter of degree. For example, 
the unconscionability doctrine as espoused in law180 applies equally to both 
commercial and consumer transactions. In practice, it has mostly been used 
in consumer transactions181 and the evidentiary threshold to prove 
unconscionability is high.182 The doctrine of impracticability,183 the 
American equivalent to German hardship,184 is an empty vessel with very 
little content. American courts rarely grant an exemption of liability to a party 
from contracts that have become onerously burdensome due to an unexpected 
change of circumstances after the contract was formed. 
In the area of remedies, common law places an outsized premium on 
freedom of contract and private autonomy norms and views damages as the 
preferred remedy. Examples of arguments that disfavor SP as a remedy 
include Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s adage that contracts do not require 
                                                          
313 of the BGB, allows relief to a party where there has been a ‘fundamental’ change in 
circumstances, which would render unfair the enforcement of the contract without the revision 
of the parties’ obligations.”). 
 179 In American law, the principle of hardship is found in the doctrine of impracticability. 
See U.C.C. § 2-615 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). 
 180 U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
 181 FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, at 330 (“most of the parties that have successfully invoked 
the doctrine of unconscionability have been consumers.”). Farnsworth notes that: “Courts have 
generally been chary about using the doctrine of unconscionability to protect merchants and 
similar professionals and have declined to apply the doctrine in favor of sophisticated 
corporations.’ Id. at 331-32; but see Jane P. Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts between 
Merchants, 40 SW. L. J. 1065, 1088 (1986) (“Although consumers have been the primary 
beneficiaries of the doctrine of unconscionability, the case law reveals an increasing tendency 
to recognize that commercial parties can be victimized by the same types of bargaining 
unfairness that stimulated the rebirth and expansion of unconscionability.”). 
 182 See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor’s New Clause, 
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 531-33 (1967) (a highly influential article, generally adopted by the 
courts, requires that a party has to provide evidence of both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability). See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at 582-85 (noting the general use of 
the procedural-substantive approach to unconscionability). 
 183 U.C.C. § 2-615 (“Excuse by failure of presupposed conditions [is] . . . not a breach of . 
. . duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the 
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which 
the contract was made . . .”). 
 184 The idea of hardship or an imbalance in the contract (although it is still possible to 
perform) is found in German Civil Code or Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 313. “German 
law, however, has recently chosen the path of codification with a clear primacy of judicial 
adaptation of contract over discharge: § 313 BGB on ‘hardship’ was added to the German civil 
code (Burgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB) in the course of modernizing the German law of 
obligations.” Hannes Rösler, Hardship in German Codified Private Law - In Comparative 
Perspective to English, French and International Contract Law, 15 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 483, 
485 (2007). 
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performance but merely give each of the parties the right to sue for 
damages,185 and Steven Shavell’s assertion of the morality of breach under 
an economic analysis of contract law.186 
The civil law embraces freedom of contract but also focuses on the 
fairness of the exchange. In German law, the duty of good faith places an 
outsized role in the interpretation of contracts and the application of contract 
law.187 Thus, one-sided, non-customary terms perfunctorily enforced in 
common law may be unenforceable in German law as a violation of the duty 
of good faith and its standard terms rules.188 The importance of the fairness 
of the bargain, whether ex ante or ex post, is demonstrated in the German 
hardship doctrine.189 Ex ante fairness is weighed in the interpretation of 
contracts through the prism of good faith. Ex post fairness is weighed in the 
courts’ determination if a change of circumstances has placed an undue 
burden on a party to perform. The normal methodology is for German courts 
to affix an equilibrium based upon the agreement at the time of formation 
and then to determine if there has been a substantial change in that 
equilibrium due to a change of circumstances.190 The courts can then bring 
the contractual equilibrium back into balance through the hardship principle. 
Under the hardship principle, when a contract becomes significantly 
imbalanced then the parties have an implied duty to re-negotiate the contract 
to bring it back into equilibrium.191 If a party fails to use reasonable efforts 
to negotiate an adjustment or reformation of the contract, the court may view 
that as an act of bad faith. In the end, this results in German contract law 
being more relational in nature, meaning the parties are likely to agree to an 
adjustment in cases of true hardship given the expectation of acting in good 
faith. This type of forced renegotiation and judicial intervention to re-balance 
a contract ex post is anathema to the common law, where the courts have a 
negative obligation to rescue parties to contracts that have become one-sided. 
                                                          
 185 See Holmes, supra note 16, at 462. 
 186 See Shavell, supra note 12. 
 187 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], § 242. 
 188 The German BGB, unlike the American U.C.C., has specific provisions restricting the 
enforceability of standard terms: Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], §§ 305 (places 
some requirement for incorporating standard terms), 305(c) (standard terms are “so unusual 
that the other party to the contract with the user need not expect to encounter them, do not 
form part of the contract”), 308 and 309 (listing a number of prohibited (unenforceable) 
terms). 
 189 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE],) § 275, para. 2, sentence 1, 
translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html (Ger.) (“The 
obligor may refuse performance to the extent that performance requires expense and effort 
which, taking into account the subject matter of the obligation and the requirements of good 
faith, is grossly disproportionate to the interest in performance of the obligee.”). 
 190 Id. (“[P]erformance requires expense and . . . is grossly disproportionate to the interest 
in performance of the obligee.”). 
 191 In referring to BGB § 313, one scholar states that “further instruments are needed to 
address changed circumstances that fundamentally alter the equilibrium of the contract.” 
Rösler, supra note 185, at 485. 
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This idea of equilibrium of contract is found, in a much more modest 
way, in the common law’s use of SP. Since SP evolved out of equity law, a 
prerequisite for obtaining a SP order is that the contract itself must be 
equitable.192 The common law courts do not hesitate in giving damages based 
on a severely one-sided contract, meaning that often the beneficiary of a one-
sided contract is the non-breaching party who is able to collect damages 
based on the contract’s one-sidedness. However, if that party seeks the 
remedy of SP, it will be denied because of the contract’s one-sidedness. 
The idea of types of contracts or taxonomy of contracts, or what Karl 
Llewellyn called transaction-types,193 is based on the notion that over time 
contracts become differentiated from one another in categories or pathways 
of contracting. So, contracts will be readily recognized as a sale of goods, 
sale of real estate, franchise, or agency contracts, and so forth. And, each type 
of contract will possess its own normative structure including various 
customary practices, usages, and standard terms. The type of contract will 
also be a factor in determining the appropriate remedy in cases of breach. In 
sum, the empirical survey provided the importance of the categorizing 
(taxonomy) contracts in courts’ decisions to provide the remedy of SP, 
especially in the Chinese court system. This proposition will be explored 
further in the next section. 
B. Specific Performance in Chinese Contract Practice 
The above discussion of the normative underpinnings of contract law 
can be used to better understand the use of SP in Chinese courts. The Chinese 
legal system is characterized as a type of civil law, but it is important to note 
that the common law has also influenced the creation of modern Chinese 
law.194 The history of Chinese law shows that the Chinese courts are 
comfortable in following the decisions of other courts, which resembles the 
notion of the law of precedents (stare decisis) that is the core feature of 
common law.195 There is strong evidence of a common-law style of legal 
system, based upon panwen (written legal documents, judgments or 
                                                          
 192 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364(1)(c) (1981) (“Specific performance . . . 
will be refused if such relief would be unfair because . . . the exchange is grossly inadequate 
or the terms of the contract are otherwise unfair.”). 
 193 Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, in THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 15 (Jody Kraus & 
Steven eds., 2000) (summarizing Llewellyn’s analysis of transaction-types: “[A]n analyst will 
develop a model to show what contract term respecting damages would be efficient for a 
particular transaction type.”). See also Todd D. Rakoff, Social Structure, Legal Structure, and 
Default Rules: A Comment, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 19, 22 (1993) (noting that the 
construction of legal categories is partially an adoption of roles and transactions defined by 
society). 
 194 The common law concepts of anticipatory repudiation and adequate assurance are 
found in the Chinese Contract Law; also, the People’s Supreme Court implemented a system 
of “Guiding Cases” to assist lower courts in the application of Chinese law. 
 195 See Availability of Specific Remedies, supra note 20, at 168-69. 
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decisions), dating back to the pre-Qin dynasty (before 221 B.C.).196 The 
empirical study has shown that Chinese courts’ SP orders coalesce around a 
number of common rationales. This results in similar case outcomes as found 
in a case-based common law.197 Additionally, today’s Guiding Case system 
established by the SPC has historical precedence. Dong Zhongshu also 
created hypothetical or model panwen system (Chunqiu Jueyu practice) 
during the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-208 A.D.), which can be seen as the 
precursor to the Chinese SPC’s practice of issuing Guiding Opinions.198 The 
model or guiding cases are applied to decide real cases in order to bring 
consistency and objectivity to the legal order. 
The frugality of Chinese courts in issuing SP orders may indicate that 
the efficiency of SP is a concern. The supervision or transaction costs of SP, 
depending on the nature of the performance being compelled, often are 
viewed as substantially higher than the awarding of damages. The survey 
showed that the concern over higher costs of enforcement was an important 
but not controlling factor in court decisions on whether to issue SP. The 
competing factors include fairness, good faith, and reasonableness. Although 
these countervailing factors are not suggested in the formal law, especially 
in cases where the claimant asks for SP, the courts police the use of SP. The 
law states that it is the aggrieved party that selects the choice between 
damages and SP. In fact, the decision to order SP is a combination of party 
and judicial choice. For example, if the non-performing party elects not to 
cover by buying substituted goods and then demands SP, a court may see this 
as a violation of the party’s duty to mitigate damages. Generally, requests for 
SP may be deemed to be unreasonable or an act of bad faith depending on 
the factual scenario and type of contract in dispute. The evidence shows that 
Chinese courts are familiar with other court rulings in this area and follow a 
widely accepted taxonomy of contract approach in deciding to issue SP. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This article employs statistical data analysis and qualitative interviews 
of Chinese judges to investigate the theoretical foundation and practical 
application of SP in China as a contractual remedy in civil and commercial 
                                                          
 196 Norman P. Ho, Confucian Jurisprudence in Practice: Pre-Tang Dynasty Panwen 
(Written Legal Judgments), 22 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J., 49, 55-56 (2013). 
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disputes across the three levels of the Chinese court system. The findings 
indicate that: (1) the awards of SP as a remedy are less frequent than 
commonly assumed; (2) judges in the Chinese court system take a proactive 
role in the preliminary stages of a trial and actively persuade the aggrieved 
party to accept damages rather than seek an order of SP; (3) lower courts are 
more likely to order SP, but at the same time the breaching parties at that 
level of the court system are more likely to settle for damages; and (4) 
concern for supervision costs associated with SP is not a determining or 
predictive factor of the courts’ reasoning on whether or not to grant SP. 
First, the findings show that despite the view of SP has an ordinary 
remedy, Chinese courts seek efficiency by ensuring that the aggrieved party’s 
interests are not overprotected. They have done this by imposing a number 
of restrictions on the availability of SP. The restrictions are broadly worded 
and can be used to offset a plaintiff’s claim for SP. Damages are awarded 
when SP is impossible, impractical or excessive, or when the aggrieved party 
does not make a claim for SP within a reasonable period of time. This limiting 
language indicates that the courts see the giving of damages as the preferred 
remedy and SP as an extraordinary remedy. The abstract phraseology of 
impractical and excessive gives the courts a great deal of discretion in dealing 
with claims for SP. Furthermore, a claim that is well within the limitation 
period (statute of limitations) may be rejected as untimely within the 
“reasonable period of time” standard relating to SP.199 
There seems little practical difference between the applications of SP in 
the common law world as compared to the civil law system in China.200 
Demands for SP orders are usually only granted in situations where a 
common law court would do the same.201 This does not imply that there is no 
longer any divergence between Chinese law and common law on the 
prioritization of the remedies of damages and SP. 
Second, judges will, before the court hearing, determine the probability 
of issuing a SP order in any given case by weighing the benefits to the 
aggrieved party and general public, against the difficulties of enforcement. 
Usually, the more experienced judges will exercise the power of persuasion 
to encourage an aggrieved party to change its claim from SP to damages. 
Third, even if there is a good chance that the court would order SP, the 
aggrieved party might want to avoid the risk of expensive and lengthy 
proceedings. The cost of litigation may be high due to legal fees, and it may 
be time-consuming to convince the court to issue a SP order. Also, there is a 
great deal of uncertainty in the enforcement of SP orders. The effectiveness 
of the enforcement of court decisions has long been regarded as notoriously 
deficient in China.202There are also costs and risks on the side of the 
                                                          
 199 HAN, supra note 4, at 771. 
 200 ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 156, at 484. 
 201 Lando & Rose, supra note 3. 
 202 Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The Enforcement 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 40:275 (2020) 
332 
defendant. In some instances the plausible threat of SP may encourage the 
defendant to seek a settlement for the payment of damages. 
Finally, from the court’s perspective, if the process of enforcement is 
likely to be difficult and unduly lengthy, there is a high probability that a 
court would decline to issue a SP order. However, the greater preference for 
damages awards in the High Courts in China is not replicated in the lower 
courts. Trial Court judges are focused on not being overturned by appellate 
courts and less concerned about enforcement costs. This is due to personal 
considerations since being overturned affects the Trial judges’ performance 
rating. Furthermore, enforcement of SP orders is the responsibility of the 
enforcement division of the court and not the court that issued the order. 
The empirical study presented in this article on the use of SP in the 
Chinese court system provides support for the proposition that the divergence 
between the civil and common law views of SP as an ordinary or 
extraordinary remedy is not as wide as depicted in the formal law. It is also 
the case that Chinese law has been influenced by a common-law-like view of 
case law. The study makes clear that the labeling of SP as an ordinary or 
extraordinary remedy is not reflected in Chinese court practice. Chinese 
courts are influenced by a recognized taxonomy of contracts in determining 
which types of contracts are deserving of SP. In fact, Chinese courts’ 
frugality in the issuance of SP orders bring them closer to the approach taken 
in the common law. 
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